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I. INTRODUCTION
Hong Kong should continue to command international attention in its
political evolution not only because it provides a unique example of a polity
in transition but also because it gauges the tolerance level of China's Central
People's Government for political experimentation in a part of the country
that has a constitution permitting gradual political reform.
In 1997, sovereignty changed from British to Chinese hands but there
was no change to the governing system at that time. Indeed, the goal
then was preservation for the sake of stability and certainty. The point
of departure from the colonial system came with the introduction of the
Principal Officials Accountability System (POAS), which created a new
layer of political appointees to become top policy makers. Whilst
various aspects of the system remain to be worked out, it will have far
reaching consequences for Hong Kong as a whole.
In October 2000, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special
Administration (HKSAR) Tung Chee-hwa first proposed a new
"executive accountability" system during his annual policy address.1 A
year later, he promised to present "feasible proposals" although the next
term's Chief Executive would have to decide whether or not to
implement them.2 In his re-selection platform, the Chief Executive
made it clear that he wanted to put the system in place by July 2002, at
the start of the next term of office.3 On April 17, 2002, Tung, with his
second term firmly secured, announced the details of the POAS to the
Legislative Council (LegCo).4  LegCo was pressured to approve the
proposed system within two months. During a government motion in
LegCo to approve the POAS in principle on May 29 and 30, 2002, many
legislators remarked that they had been given insufficient time to
deliberate the issues involved.
1. Tung Chee-hwa, Serving the Community, Sharing Common Goals, Chief
Executive Policy Address, at paras. 109-13 (Oct. 11, 2000), at
http://www.policyaddress.gov.hk/paOI/eindex/html.
2. Tung Chee-hwa, Building on our Strengths, Investing in our Future, Chief
Executive Policy Address, at paras. 130-40 (Oct. 10, 2001), at
http://www.policyaddress.gov.kh/paOI/speech-e.htm.
3. Tung Chee-hwa, My Pledge to the People of Hong Kong (Jan. 29, 2002), at
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200112/13/eng20011213_86634.shtml.
4. Tung Chee-hwa, Address to the Legislative Council on the Introduction of the
POAS (April 17, 2002), at http://www.info.gov.hk/ce/speech/cesp.htm [hereinafter Tung,
Speech to LegCo on the POAS, April 17, 2002]. See infra Appendix I for the full text.
Despite the haste with which it was promoted, the POAS is an
important milestone in Hong Kong's political evolution. It has
introduced fundamental change to Hong Kong's governing system that
is unprecedented in scope and complexity. There are opportunities as
well as pitfalls. The POAS represents a tacit acknowledgement that the
system of governance envisaged in the Basic Law, Hong Kong's post-
1997 constitution, was not functioning well.
Although many critics have impugned the Chief Executive for his lack
of effective leadership, they have also acknowledged that the tension
between the executive and civil service has hampered his efforts to
address the HKSAR's troubles. The POAS represents a partial victory for
the Chief Executive over top administrators. However, with its promise to
improve the administrative apparatus, the POAS has raised expectations.
The executive's performance will be constantly monitored and pressure
will be high, Putting the POAS in place and making it work will require
the Chief Executive and his close advisers to build a wider base of
political support, which must include the battered civil service. Moreover,
with Tung Chee-hwa ineligible for a third term of office in 2007, the
POAS provides a new testing ground for ambitious politicians.5
Beijing had originally envisaged Hong Kong to be an economic city with
mild politics. The Central People's Government might find that economic
policies cannot be developed and implemented in a modem society without
rigorous debate among stakeholders as well as public participation via the
ballot box. Regardless of whether Hong Kong was intended to be an
experimentation zone for political reform or not, the HKSAR is a part of
China where democratic reform is openly and frequently discussed. As
such, despite constraints on Hong Kong developing a fully democratic
system, the HKSAR will continue to provide a window through which the
world can observe the subtleties of Chinese politics-and assess Beijing's
appetite for "controlled" political reform.
Although the Basic Law anticipates major change to the electoral
system some time after 2007 for the Chief Executive and members of the
legislature, questions remain about the commitment of the current
government and authorities in Beijing to these reforms. The POAS
represents a fundamental alteration to the system of governance in Hong
Kong that could very well make it the fulcrum upon which further
reform will turn. As it now stands, the POAS does not in fact go far
enough to fulfill the promises of better governance, and further
adjustments will be required. The need for further reform of the system
5. Article 46 of the Basic Law stipulates a term limit of two consecutive terms.
THE BASIC LAW OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATION REGION OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 29 I.L.M. 1511 art. 46 (1990) [hereinafter BASIC LAW].
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as a whole must eventually include the building of a much more
purposeful relationship between the executive and legislative branches.
Despite the outlook for increased pressures for reform, the next few years
present a tremendous challenge to the "opposition". The POAS is likely to
produce a new political elite with the advantage of executive power on its
side. This new elite is bound to try and develop wider public support. The
"opposition" in the legislature-Hong Kong's current crop of professional
and elected politicians-will be forced to adapt to a different environment.
Within the first month of implementing the POAS, the Chief Executive
had to face his first political "crisis" arising from the stock exchange's
publication of proposed criteria for continuing listing eligibility, which led
to a panic sell-off of micro-cap stocks. The responsible principal officials as
well as the respective heads of the stock exchange and the securities
regulatory body were all embroiled in controversy. The "crisis" offers
insights into the functioning of POAS, which is discussed in Part VII.
This Article seeks to discuss a range of issues related to the POAS.
These issues include:
" The "one country, two systems" framework;
* The background to the introduction of the POAS;
* The fundamentals of the POAS;
* The notion of accountability pre- and post-POAS;
" An evaluation of executive government systems;
* The issues arising from the implementation of POAS; and,
* A best practice ministerial model for Hong Kong.
II. "ONE COUNTRY, Two SYSTEMS" FRAMEWORK
The "one country, two systems" principle forms the main pillar of
Beijing's Hong Kong policy enabling the HKSAR to exercise "a high
degree of autonomy" and to have "Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong."
It is a political innovation based on pragmatism that can be seen from both a
domestic and an international perspective. Beijing's policy is enshrined in
the Basic Law to allow the coexistence of socialist China with capitalist
Hong Kong within "one country". The highly pragmatic policy,
encapsulated in the phrase, changqi dasuan, chongfen liyong, was designed
to enable Beijing to use Hong Kong to the maximum extent to contribute to
China's economic modernization and facilitate other areas of policy
development. 6 Scholars Poon Kit and Kuan Hsin-shi pointed out that it also
represents "a credibility test for China as a world power, demonstrating its
willingness to honor its international pledge toward Hong Kong and its
capability to manage a world-class city" after British rule.7
Since the transition in 1997, Beijing has shown significant self-
restraint in leaving Hong Kong authorities to govern Hong Kong. Self-
restraint has not meant disinterest, however. Indeed, Beijing has kept a
close eye on Hong Kong. Its overall stance has been to show support for
the Chief Executive, who is directly accountable to the Central People's
Government. 8 Tung Chee-hwa was Beijing's original choice to lead
Hong Kong, and Beijing backed him for a second term. 9
The Chief Executive has likely had extensive discussions with Beijing
on the development of the POAS. In fact, the procedure for installing
the principal officials entails a nomination by the Chief Executive and
actual approval by the Central People's Government.10
Beijing will likely remain wary of substantial political reform in the
HKSAR in the foreseeable future. During a June 26, 2002 speech in Hong
Kong, Vice-premier Qian Qichen reminded the public of Beijing's reluctance:
To promote democracy in Hong Kong, one cannot have Hong Kong emulate the
system of other regions.... Hong Kong is a commercial city and it is one of our
country's special administrative regions. This determines that it cannot copy
the political systems of another country. The past practices have shown that
model based on functional constituency elections is an effective way to ensure
that people from various walks of life can have balanced participation in
political life. As a result, this should be kept intact. Other systems that also
conform to Hong Kong's characteristics should also be retained.'1
A. Constitutionality of the POAS
Although the POAS represents the most significant step towards political
reform to date, as well as the first major departure from the colonial style of
governing, the HKSAR Government determined that the Basic Law did not
need to be amended to implement the POAS. During legislative scrutiny of
6. Other areas of policy include using Hong Kong to earn hard currency, to
provide a window to the outside world, and to provide neutral ground for conducting
informal contacts with Taiwan. HoU Li, THE CLOSURE OF A HUNDRED YEARS OF
HUMILIATION: THE BEGINNING AND THE END OF THE HONG KONG ISSUE 125 (1997).
7. Poon Kit & Kuan Hsin-shi, The Hollowing Out of the "One Country, Two
Systems" Framework: China's Hong Kong Policy in a Changing Context (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the authors).
8. BASIC LAW, supra note 5, art. 43.
9. The current Chief Executive, Tung Chee-hwa, was chosen prior to 1997 through
a selection process of 400 people. In 2002, he was the sole candidate for re-selection.
Several top Chinese leaders publicly stated that they supported Tung for a second term.
10. See BASIC LAW, supra note 5, art. 15.
11. Qian Qichen, HK democracy must forge own path, not emulate others, SOUTH
CHINA MORNING POST, June 26, 2002, at 6 (edited transport).
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the POAS, critics questioned whether it accorded with the Constitution
because Basic Law drafters had sought to preserve a civil service-led
system. An examination of those parts of the Basic Law relating to the civil
service makes this clear. These provisions indicate that the Constitution
envisages a civil service-led system and the continuation of civil servants
assuming both administrative and ministerial roles.12
The HKSAR Government has argued that the POAS is consistent with
the spirit of the Basic Law because there is no specific prohibition
against appointing political heads to government departments, nor is
there a requirement that principal officials must be employed as civil
servants. The government also argues that the underlying theme of
continuity in the Constitution did not prevent changes.13  In contrast,
officials say that, despite the Basic Law's explicit statement that the
HKSAR's ultimate aim is a fully elected LegCo and directly elected
Chief Executive, Hong Kong needs to move cautiously ahead.
The Basic Law was designed to establish a political system where
power flows from the Chief Executive. The Chief Executive has
countered criticisms that the POAS concentrates power in the Chief
Executive by stating that he already had this power and that the POAS
was a device to devolve power to his principal officials.
14
12. See BASiC LAW, supra note 5, arts. 99-103.
13. Although the Basic Law does not provide for a ministerial-type of appointment, it
does not explicitly prohibit it. Similar issues have arisen in other jurisdictions. For example,
Australia's written constitution has no specific provision about cabinet government and a
range of other aspects related to a Westminster-style ministerial system. Nevertheless, it is
well-established that those "extra-constitutional" measures are legitimated and permitted
under the Constitution. Some of the practices, such as ministerial responsibility, are classified
as constitutional conventions. LC Paper CB(2)1735/01-02(01) (Apr. 25, 2002), at
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yrOl-02/english/hc/sub-com/hs5l/papers/hs5 Ippr.htm.
14. The Basic Law provides that the Chief Executive is the head of the HKSAR
Government. He leads the Government and the civil service. According to the Basic
Law, the powers of the officials of the HKSAR Government originate from the Chief
Executive. It is for the Chief Executive to determine how he should delegate his
authority according to his policy agenda. As the Basic Law has already conferred all
necessary powers on the Chief Executive, there is no need for these powers to be
strengthened by the new system .... In fact, in implementing the Accountability
System, the Chief Executive will be devolving further his authority ....
Tung, Speech to LegCo on POAS, April 17, 2002, supra note 4. The Chief Secretary also
emphasized in a speech to the British Chamber of Commerce on April 25, 2002 that: "If you
look at the Basic Law, the Chief Executive has all the power he needs. All political and
administrative power flows from his constitutional position at the apex of government in
Hong Kong." Donald Tsang, CS's Speech, Address delivered at Luncheon of British
Chamber of Commerce at the Hong Kong Convention and Exhibition Centre (Apr. 25, 2002),
at http:# www.info.gov.hk/gia/general200204/25/0425224.htm.
Regardless of how the introduction of the POAS affects the hallowed
status of the Basic Law, it provides a new staging-point for future
changes to deal with real challenges to governance in Hong Kong. By
arguing that what is not expressly prohibited in the Basic Law is
consistent with the Basic Law, the HKSAR Government has opened the
door for others to use the same argument for further reform. It will be
difficult for the HKSAR Government to argue in the future that what is
not expressly provided for is inconsistent with the Basic Law.'
5
B. Limited Scope of Further Reform
Nevertheless, the prospects for a more significant legislative role in
government do not appear bright. Despite references in the Basic Law that
constitutional change is possible at an unspecified time after 2007,16 Article
59 is explicit that the government of the HKSAR "shall be the executive
authorities," which does not include the legislature. Although Article 64
provides for the government (headed by the Chief Executive) to be
accountable to the legislature, the Basic Law does not envisage a power-
sharing relationship between the executive and the legislature. For that to
happen, the core of the Basic Law would need to be amended. Most
observers cannot imagine that Beijing would, in the near term, allow such a
substantial reform within the "one-country, two systems" framework. Yet,
there is room for incremental electoral reform, which represents an important
opportunity to create and define a unique polity within a one-party state.
III. BACKGROUND TO THE INTRODUCTION OF THE POAS
A. Troubled Early Years
The new HKSAR Government had faced a series of challenges from the
start. 17 The Asian financial crisis that began in 1997 reverberated through all
the regional economies. The authorities had to confront volatile conditions
in the property and stock markets as well as rising unemployment.' 8 The
15. During the LegCo scrutiny process, legislators pointed out that the HKSAR
Government "should not use different reasoning at different time to suit different needs,
and that a consistent approach should be adopted in interpreting the Basic Law." LC
Paper CB(2)2015/01-02 (May 22, 2002) at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yrOl-02/english/
hc/papers/hc0524cb2-2015.pdf.
16. See BASIC LAW, supra note 5, arts. 45-68, annex II (providing the possibility
for electoral reform in the future).
17. For a useful record of the early years see generally THE FIRST TUNG CHEE-HWA
ADMINISTRATION-THE FIRST FIVE YEARS OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE
REGION (Lau Siu-Kai ed., 2002).
18. The HKSAR Government's intervention in the stock market in 1998 was a
controversial decision.
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avian flu outbreak in 1997 resulted in a mass slaughter of more than 1.3
million chickens and ducks. The discovery of piling defects in several
public housing blocks led to calls for the resignation of housing officials.
The opening of the new airport at Chek Lap Kok was chaotic. The decision
to bypass existing tender procedures to award the Cyberport development to
one party added to the perception of incompetent leadership. During the
first three years in office, the legislature raised two motions of no
confidence against specific senior members of the executive adding to a
general sense that Hong Kong suffered from poor governance. 19
B. Inexperienced Leadership and Poor Management of
Public Expectation
The leadership's failure to articulate clear political objectives for its
various policies and build the necessary policy consensus both within the
administration and with the public contributed to the problems of the early
years. One consequence was that the relationship between the Chief
Executive and top civil servants deteriorated. A stark example of this
failure was the Chief Executive's major initiative to build 85,000 housing
units a year without any clear annunciations of its political objectives, policy
strategies, and technical and procedural goals. This left the administration
as a whole unable to coordinate its response in the face of a deteriorating
economic environment. On the one hand, the Chief Executive felt the civil
servants did not sufficiently support his efforts. On the other, the civil
servants believed that the Chief Executive and his other advisors had failed
to heed their advice. Within eighteen months, the target was simply
dropped without proper explanation causing much public confusion and
damaging the credibility of both the Chief Executive and the civil service.2°
19. Many critics saw the development as essentially a property rather than a specialized
information technology development that any developer should have been able to do.
However, the HKSAR Government promoted it as an IT project, arguing that the designated
party was the best one to develop the site. Although unsuccessful, the motion of no
confidence raised on March 11, 1999 against the Secretary for Justice for her decision not to
prosecute newspaper publisher Sally Aw Sian, whose deputies were convicted of corruption
charges, damaged the government's creditability. On June 28, 2000, the legislature passed a
motion of no confidence against the Chairperson of the Housing Authority (who was also an
Executive Councilor) and the Director of Housing for defective piling in a number of public
housing blocks. The Chairperson had in fact resigned on June 24, 2002.
20. On June 30, 2000, the Chief Executive revealed on a TV program that he had
dropped his target for 85,000 housing units over a year back in 1998. Senior housing
officials had not been told about the Chief Executive's decision further damaging the
government's credibility. See Lok Sang-Ho, Policy Blunder of the Century Threatens
C. Intra-Executive Tensions
Amid the challenges presented by the external economic conditions
and other unexpected challenges, the crisis of leadership sapped Hong
Kong's confidence. Serious intra-executive tensions emerged between
the Chief Executive, his close advisers, and the senior ranks of the civil
service. It became apparent that there were two different understandings of
what an "executive-led" government meant.2' The Chief Executive
and his close advisers saw power arising from the Chief Executive in
a style of executive government more akin to the running of a private
corporation. The civil service operated in accordance with past
practice, essentially a bureaucratic-led administration steeped in a
public service tradition. Senior civil servants regarded the in-coming
Chief Executive and his advisers as inexperienced. The Chief
Executive and his advisers in turn viewed the administrators as
disrespectful. According to the senior ranks of the service, their
responsibility was to give honest advice to the Chief Executive
regardless of whether it may run counter to his personal preferences.
The Chief Executive and his advisors saw the bureaucrats as
obstructionist. There were also substantial differences and disagreements
on a variety of issues, including the relationship with Beijing and
human rights and political freedoms.22
D. LegCo's Call for Accountability
The series of blunders by the first HKSAR Government provoked
public discussion on how to make government decision-makers
"accountable" for their decisions. Accountability in this sense meant
Hong Kong Economic Future, in THE FIRST TUNG CHEE-HWA ADMINISTRATION-THE
FIRST FIVE YEARS OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, supra note 17,
ch. 8 for a useful summary of land and housing policy issues.
21. Anthony Cheung, Transforming the Post-97 Hong Kong Civil Service:
Reconfiguring the Mandarinate and the Rise of a Political Class, Session 39: Crisis and
Transformation in China's Hong Kong since 1997, Association for Asian Studies, 54th
Annual Meeting, April 4-7, 2002. Furthermore, a close reading of the Chief Executive's
address in announcing the POAS provides many clues to how he sees the civil service
having been an impediment to his leadership.
22. The relationship between ExCo [Executive Council] and the civil servants is
uneasy and occasionally combative.., most of the ExCo members appointed
by Tung hold different political views and policy ideas from those of the civil
servants. Moreover, a number of ExCo members, especially those with pro-
Beijing bias or business background, hold the [civil servants] in contempt,
which is fully and bitterly reciprocated.
Lau Siu-kai, Tung Chee-hwa's Governing Strategy: The Shortfall in Politics, in THE
FIRST TUNG CHEE-HWA ADMINISTRATION: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS OF THE HONG KONG
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, supra note 17, at 12-13. Lau was appointed to head
the Central Policy Unit for the Chief Executive's second term of office.
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that they should resign to take political responsibility. In June 2000,
LegCo recommended that the HKSAR Government should:
Explore the feasibility of developing constitutional conventions under which
principal officials shall voluntarily resign as a result of having committed
serious mistakes in the formulation or implementation of government policies;
and Study the proposal of implementing a more flexible contract system so that
principal officials may be held politically accountable for their decisions.
23
E. Chief Executive's Response
In his October 2000 Policy Address, the Chief Executive
responded: "As Hong Kong people are now running Hong Kong, I
appreciate their aspirations for the SAR Government to be subjected
to a higher degree of accountability." He undertook to review "the
accountability of principal officials for their respective policy
portfolios" by devising a new system of appointment, stating that a
decision would be made soon.24
The response of LegCo and the public was on the whole positive. 5
Government papers show that the Chief Executive set up and chaired a
special Steering Group to consider a new accountability system.26 The
Steering Group concluded that there was "broad consensus on the need
to re-jig the top echelon of senior officials and for a new system of
appointments, but views on the detailed arrangements differed. '27
In his October 2001 Policy Address, the Chief Executive described the
basic framework of the new accountability system. He made it clear that
the new system of appointing principal officials would be put in place
for the Chief Executive's second term of office (2002-07), and that the
Chief Executive would nominate and recommend candidates to the
Central People's Government for appointment.28
23. LegCo adopted in a motion debate on June 14, 2000 the report of its Panel on
Constitutional Affairs on The Development of the Political System of Hong Kong. LC
Paper CB(2)2207/00-01(01) (Aug. 27, 2001), at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr00-
01/english/hc/papers/hc0607cb2-2207.pdf.
24. Tung, supra note 3, at paras. 111-22.
25. LC Paper CB(2)2007/00-01(01) (Aug. 27, 2001), at http://www.legco.gov.hk/
yrOO-01/english/hc/papers/hc0607cb2-2007.pdf.
26. Members of the Steering Group were the most senior officials-Chief
Secretary, Financial Secretary, Secretary for Justice, Secretary for Constitutional
Affairs, Secretary for the Civil Service, Head of the Central Policy Unit and
Information Coordinator.
27. LC Paper CB(2)2261/00-01(0l), at paras. 3-4 (Aug. 27, 2001), at
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yrO0-0l/english/panels/ca/papers/b2261 e0 i.pdf.
28. Tung, supra note 3, at paras. 130-40.
On December 13, 2001, Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa declared his
intention to stand for a second term of office. In his published pledge,
he stated:
Over the past four years or so, I have constantly reflected on how we could have
done better, for there are undoubtedly deficiencies. In particular, I believe the
development and implementation of some policy initiatives could have been
better managed; the interests of different sectors better balanced; the reform
initiatives better prioritized; and the response and reaction of the community
better assessed. 29
A key plank of his second term platform was to implement the new
accountability system by July 1, 2002:
Through a more accountable system, senior officials will better serve the
community. In addition, we believe this will foster a more service-oriented
culture within the entire civil service that is in tune with the times. Following
introduction of the new accountability system, we will restructure the Executive
Council to ensure that this body performs its role in an effective manner. 30
By the end of the nomination period on February 28, 2002, Tung
Chee-hwa had secured 714 valid nominations among the 800-member
Election Committee and was declared the "winner" of the selection
process. Once campaign formalities were completed, he announced the
details to the POAS at a special LegCo meeting on April 17, 2002. He
again made it clear that he wanted it in place by July 1, 2002.
F. Ad Hoc Reform
Legislators complained that they did not have enough time to
scrutinize the proposal. The official view was that Hong Kong had
had sufficient time to discuss the new system because it had been
first raised in October 2000. Critics argued that despite earlier
allusions to the new system, solid details of the proposal were not
articulated until quite late in the implementation process. Officials
promoting the POAS defended the tight timetable by saying that the
government had exchanged views with legislators and others on
various occasions. 31 Moreover, they claimed that the government had
the public's support to push ahead as evidenced by an opinion survey
conducted in May 2002.32
29. Tung, supra note 4, at 4-5.
30. Id.
31. LC Paper CB(2)2015/01-02, supra note 15.
32. Critics argued that the survey asked leading questions, the principle one being:
"Do you support the HKSAR Government's proposal to introduce the Accountability
System for Principal Officials to enhance its accountability to the public?" Opinion
Survey on Public's Views Towards the Accountability System for Principal Officials,
(AC Nielsen) May 24, 2002, at http://www.info.gov.hk/hab/content/index.htm.
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The HKSAR Government used subsidiary legislation in the form of a
Resolution to effect substantive change in the government structure and
creation of a new class of political appointees-the principal officials.33
Some legislators complained that the executive should have proposed new
primary legislation to establish the POAS in view of the far-reaching effect of
the new system and with the government structure being radically changed.
Officials maintained that the new system could be implemented by means of
a Resolution. The Secretary of Justice has argued: "Where is no requirement
in the Basic Law that policy decisions of the Chief Executive, or the Chief
Executive in Council, must be formally promulgated., 34 Legislator, Margaret Ng,
noted that what LegCo was being asked to do with passing the Resolution was:
[T]o take away all the powers and functions exercised by civil servants, and put
them in the hands of these ministers. This is a kind of transfer that this Council
has certainly never seen before, neither in kind or scope . . . . This Resolution
affects at least half of the sum total of executive powers and functions our laws
have conferred on the entire government. 35
Furthermore, because the implementation of the POAS would be
accompanied by a re-organization of a number of policy bureaus, the
government used an Order (another form of subsidiary legislation) for
the other amendments needed to revise the changes to the post-titles of
the bureau heads who were to take charge of the re-organized bureaus.36
The HKSAR Government moved and successfully passed a motion
debate in LegCo on May 29, 2002 to seek support for the POAS.37 On
June 14, LegCo agreed to funding of HK$42 million (US$5.4 million) to
meet the costs of the new principal officials positions.38
33. The purpose of the Resolution under Section 54A of the Interpretation and
General Clauses Ordinance (Cap. 1) (Resolution) was to effect a transfer with effect from
July 1, 2002 of statutory functions of certain "Secretaries" who would be involved in the
amalgamation of policy portfolios pursuant to the proposed accountability system. For
details of the resolution see LC Paper LSI 12/01-02 (June 5, 2002), at
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr0l-02/english/hc/sub-com/hs5I/papers/hs5I-ppr.htm.
34. LC Paper CB(2)2000/01-02(01) (May 17, 2002), at http'/www.legco.gov.hk/yr01-
02/english/hc/subcom/hs5l/papers/hs5lppr.htm.; Secretary of Justice, Speech at the LegCo
motion debate (May 30, 2002), at http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200205/30/0530237.htm.
35. Margaret Ng, Speech at the debate on the passage of the Resolution (June 19, 2002).
36. LegCo also had to pass a new order subsequent to the passage of the
Resolution under Schedule 6 to the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance to
effect changes to post titles. See LC Paper CB(2)2068/01-02(02) (May 2002), at
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yrO1-02/english/hc/sub-comlhs5 l/papers/hs5 l-ppr.htm.
37. The motion was passed thirty-five in favor and seventeen against.
38. The cash remuneration of the fourteen principal officials is among the highest in the
world, commensurate with pay in the private sector for top executives. The Chief Secretary
earns HK$345,850 (US$44,400), the Financial Secretary earns HK$334,150 (US$43,000), the
On June 19, 2002, LegCo passed the resolution to affect the
reorganization of the policy bureaus thereby completing the process for
setting up the POAS.39 On June 24, the Chief Executive announced the new
line-up for his second term of office: the principal officials, the new
members of the Executive Council, the Director of the Chief Executive's
Office, and the head of the Central Policy Unit (a government think-tank).40
IV. FUNDAMENTALS OF THE POAS
41
In his announcement of the POAS, the Chief Executive said that he
expected the principal officials to be "motivated by common
perspectives, shared policy goals and a collective mission" and that the
new system would "bring about a new style of governance" where
principal officials and the HKSAR Government would "have to assume
responsibility.., place importance on public opinion.., make further
efforts to gauge public sentiments".., and be proactive in facing the public,
and in gaining the trust and support of the public by delivering results.42
A. Objectives, Elements, and Arrangements
The HKSAR Government noted six objectives and seven major elements
of the POAS, upon which three sets of specific arrangements were based.
The following boxes provide a summary of the relevant statements.43
Secretary of Justice earns HK$322,850 (US$41,400), and each of the other eleven principal
officials earn HK$311,900 (US$40,000) per month. Justification of the financial implications
of the POAS can be found in LC Paper CB(2)2068/01-02(03) (May 27, 2002), at
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr0DI-02/english/hc/subcom/hs5l/papers/hs5 lppr.htm.
39. The Resolution was passed thirty-six in favor and twenty-one against.
40. Press Release, Chief Executive Tung Chee-Hwa, Statement on appointments
(June 24, 2002), at http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general200206/24/0624128.htm; Press
Release, Government of Hong Kong, Details of appointments of the Principal Officials
(June 24, 2002), at http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general200206/24/0624107.htm; and,
Press Release, Government of Hong Kong, Appointments of the Director of the Chief
Executive Office and the Head of the Central Policy Unit (June 24, 2002), at
http:/lwww.info.gov.hk/gia/general200206/24/0624105.htm.
41. The Constitutional Affairs Bureau produced a briefing paper, LC Paper
System of Accountability for Principal Officials Provided by Constitutional Affairs
Bureau to Members at the Council Meeting on 17 April 2002 (Apr. 17, 2002), at
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yrOl-02/english/hc/sub-com/hs5l/papers/hs5lppr.htm, for LegCo
to accompany the Chief Executive address on April 17, 2000. See discussion supra note
13 for website for all LegCo Papers.
42. See infra Appendix I.
43. Michael Suen, Secretary for Constitutional Affairs in moving a motion on the POAS
in LegCo on May 29, 2002, at http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200205/29/0529263.htm
[hereinafter Suen, Speech to LegCo, May 29, 2002].
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OBJECTIVES
1. To enhance the accountability of
principal officials for their
respective policy portfolios.
2. To enable senior government
officials to better appreciate the
aspirations of and better respond
to the community.
3. To select the best and most
suitable persons to take up the
principal positions.
4. To enhance cooperation between
the Government and LegCo.
5. To better coordinate the formulation
and implementation of policies.
6. To maintain a permanent and
politically neutral civil service.
MAJOR ELEMENTS
a. Principal officials shall be
accountable for matters falling
within their portfolios and may have
to step down for serious failures.
b. They should not come under the
civil service establishment.
c. Candidates may come from outside
or within the civil service.
d. They should be directly
responsible to the Chief Executive.
e. They shall be members of the
Executive Council and take part in
high level decision-making process.
f. They shall keep close tabs on
public sentiments to ensure
greater responsiveness.
g. They shall engage more proactively
in communication with LegCo.
SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS OF THE POAS
I. The appointment arrangements for the principal officials are more
"flexible" for the Chief Executive to appoint whom he sees fit.
II. The principle officials have "better defined powers commensurate
with their responsibilities". As members of the Executive Council,
the officials are in a better position to coordinate policy priority,
implementation and resource allocations.
111. The POAS is meant to "foster a culture of enhanced accountability".
Principal officials are expected to communicate more with LegCo and
make district visits.
B. Reorganization of Portfolios
The Chief Executive appointed a total of fourteen principal officials,
including the Chief Secretary, the Financial Secretary, the Secretary for
Justice,' and eleven Directors of Bureaus.45  A number of the policy
portfolios have been amalgamated. Changes were announced at the time of
the LegCo debate on May 29, 2002 to reorder some of the responsibilities as
a response to legislators' lobbying. Appendix II compares the previous
structure, the first proposed structure, and the final reorganized structure.
C. Revamped Executive Council
Article 55 of the Basic Law permits membership of the Executive
Council to be drawn from among the principal officials, legislators, and
public figures. All the principal officials are now members of the Executive
Council, which is the closest thing to a cabinet in Hong Kong. In addition,
there are five members with three legislators among them who have no
portfolio responsibilities: James Tien, who chairs the Liberal Party; Tsang
Yok-sing, who chairs the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong
Kong; and, Cheng Yiu-tong, who is the chairman of the Federation of Trade
Unions. The appointment of political party members sets a new convention
that people with political affidiation can serve on the Executive Council.46
During LegCo scrutiny of the POAS, legislators questioned whether a
person who is a member of a foreign or non-Hong Kong based political
party, such as the Chinese Communist Party or the Kuomintang, could
be appointed as a principal official. The official response was that
"freedom of association is protected by law in Hong Kong" and that it
was for the prospective principal official to consider whether his or her
affiliation would give rise to conflicts of interest. The affiliation should
be disclosed to the Chief Executive, and it would be for the Chief
Executive to decide whether to nominate the candidate.47
44. During the scrutiny process, some legislators objected to the position of
Secretary for Justice be made a political appointment and suggested that the Secretary's
power to make prosecution decisions should be transferred to the Director of
Prosecution, but their suggestion was rejected. See Secretary of Justice Speech (May 30,
2002), at http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200205/30/O530237.htm.
45. The title "Director of Bureau" is the official designation of a principal official
although s/he is referred to as the "Secretary" of the relevant bureau.
46. Although Tam Yiu-chung, a member of the Democratic Alliance for the
Betterment of Hong Kong, was appointed to the Executive Council during the Chief
Executive's first term of office, the appointment was seen more as a gesture to include
someone from the labor sector rather than to include political parties.
47. LC Paper CB(2)2171/01-02, at paras. 44-45 (June 6, 2002), at
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yrO1-02/english/hc/papers/hcO6O7cb2-2171.pdf. See also LC
Paper CB(2)2066/01-02(04) (May 25, 2002), at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr0l-02/
english/hc/subcom/hs5 I/papers/hs5 Ippr.htm.
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In total, there are twenty-two members in the Executive Council,
making it a much larger body than the previous one, which had twelve
members including the Chief Executive. The Executive Council is now
clearly dominated by full-time professional politicians for the first time
in Hong Kong's history. These changes have effectively turned the
Executive Council into a sort of "proto-cabinet".
Although these individuals clearly represent Hong Kong's political elite,
the Executive Council remains first and foremost an advisory body to the
Chief Executive. It has no role to check and balance the decision-making
power of the Chief Executive. Its constitutional, role as "an organ for
assisting the Chief Executive in policy-making" does not change.48 Article
56(2) of the Basic Law provides that the Chief Executive shall consult the
Executive Council before making important policy decisions, introducing
bills to the legislature, making subordinate legislation, or dissolving LegCo.
The Chief Executive chairs Executive Council meetings, and according to
Article 56(3), if he does not accept a majority opinion of the Executive
Council, he "shall put the specific reasons on record." Nevertheless,
Executive Council papers and records are kept confidential.
The official position states: "There will not be any difference in the
functions and operations of the Executive Council as provided by the
Basic Law."49 Otherwise, the Basic Law would have had to be amended
for the creation of a real cabinet. Members of the Executive Council
abide by the Principle of Collective Responsibility, which in British
parliamentary tradition implies that all ministers assume responsibility
for cabinet decisions and action taken to implement those decisions. As
such, there must be a display of public unanimity on those decisions and
actions.5 ° The three legislators, including two chairmen of respective
political parties in Hong Kong, would therefore not be able to criticize
Executive Council decisions made after their appointments.51
48.. BASIc LAW, supra note 5, art. 54.
49. LC Paper CB(2)2034/01-02(01) (May 21, 2002), at http://www.legco.gov.hk/
yrO 1-02/english/hc/subcom/hs5 1/papers/hs5l-ppr.htm.
50. A minister may disagree with a cabinet decision or with the manner of its
implementation, but if he wishes to express dissent in public he should first resign. See
STANLEY DE SMITH & RODNEY BRAZIER, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
187-88 (Penguin Books 1990) (1971).
51. To what extent this arrangement will bind members of these parties in LegCo
to vote for all Executive Council decisions remains to be seen. It is not difficult to
imagine legislators from the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong
coming under significant grassroots pressure to oppose some government decisions seen
to affecting employment or social welfare, for example. It has to be seen whether there
In another change, the Secretariat of the Executive Council hag
merged with the Office of the Chief Executive. Previously, it was
attached to the Chief Secretary's Office. This move is a clear indication
that the Chief Executive wants direct control of his key advisory body.
The Chief Secretary remarked at a press conference on the POAS on
April 17, 2002: "An Executive Council comprising, at its core, the Chief
Executive and all of his Principal Officials is much more in tune with the
Cabinet-style principles and practices of executive-led government.
52
D. Director of the Chief Executive's Office
A new political post of the Director of the Chief Executive's Office has
been created whose main job is to oversee the running of the Executive
Council Secretariat and act as the spokesperson for this office. His duties
have clear political content. Although not a principal official or member of
the Executive Council, the Director is "part of the senior team of the
HKSAR Government" and attends Executive Council meetings, and, if
invited, the Director can provide input. He cannot vote, however.53
Heated controversy arose during LegCo's discussion of the creation
of this post. Some legislators feared that the Director might become a
"special envoy" of the Chief Executive with excessive influence to
determine the agenda of Executive Council meetings as well as act as a
personal missionary for the Chief Executive. The concern was
heightened by the controversy surrounding the Robert Chung incident
where Chung had stated in a newspaper article on July 7, 2000 that the
Chief Executive had on several occasions passed to him an indirect
message that his polls on the Chief Executive were unwelcome. The
Chief Executive's senior special assistant, Andrew Lo, had discussions
in 1999 with the head of the University of Hong Kong in regards to
Robert Chung's work in carrying out public opinion surveys, which
resulted in suggestions to Chung that he perceived to have been
pressure to change his work. The incident eventually led to the
resignation of the university head and resulted in an inquiry that
will be any changes to party discipline mechanisms for these two parties as a result of
their chairmen being appointed to the Executive Council. See also infra Part VII.
52. The merger of the Executive Council's Secretariat with the Chief Executive's Office
may have been driven by the Chief Executive's desire to reduce intra-executive tension that
existed between him and his non-civil service advisors and the civil servants during his first term
of office. Donald Tsang, Opening Remarks at the Press Conference on Accountability System
(April 17, 2002), at http://www.info.gov.hk.gialgeneralU200204/17/0417271.htm.
53. Although the post is clearly a key political appointment, the Director cannot be
a principal official because that role is not provided for in the Basic Law. LC Paper
CB(2) 1929/01-02(01) (May 13, 2002), at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr01-02/english/
hc/subcom/hs51/papers/hs5 l-ppr.htm.
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severely damaged the public image of Lo and the Chief Executive.
Despite mounting public pressure, the Chief Executive refused to
remove Lo from his post.
5 4




(a) Ensure the meeting agenda
reflects the overall policy of the
government as determined by
the Chief Executive.
(b) Ensure expeditious discussion of
the Executive Council's sub-
committees' advice.




(a) Formulate media and PR
strategy.
(b) Serve as spokesperson for Chief
Executive and media liaison.
(c) Plan the Chief Executive's
public engagement program.
(d) Monitor public opinion.
There has also been considerable concern about the Director's role in
setting the meeting agenda of the Executive Council. The government response
has been that the Chief Executive will determine the overall government
policy agenda with the assistance of the Chief Secretary and the Financial
Secretary, while the Director will only ensure that the Executive Council
meeting agenda reflect the priorities of the overall government agenda.55
E. Chief Secretary's Position
The position of the Chief Secretary has been made less important even
though it remains the most senior among the principal officials. Under
the previous system, the Chief Secretary chaired the most powerful body
within the administration, the Chief Secretary's Policy Committee. It
54. See Johannes Chan, Civil Liberties: Rule of Law and Hwnan Rights, in THE FIRST TUNG
CHEE-HWA ADMINmIRATION-THE FIRsr FIVE YEARS OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISRAIVE
REGION, supra note 17, at 114 for a succinct summary of the "Robert Chung Affair".
55. See LC Paper CB(2)2068/01-02(01) at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yrOl-02/english/
hc/subcomlhs5 1/papers/hs5 l-ppr.htm (providing the job description of the Director).
was made up of a series of policy groups represented by the heads of the
policy bureaus. The Chief Secretary played a leading role in
coordinating policy-making and arbitrated conflicts among the bureaus
heads. With the POAS designed to make the principal officials take
direct political responsibility, the Chief Secretary will play more of a
coordination role. As a result, under the POAS there is significantly less
scope for the Chief Secretary to make the final decision on policy than
was the case previously.
Under the new system, the Chief Secretary will chair various
Executive Council sub-committees that replace the policy groups under
the Chief Secretary Committee.56 The Chief Secretary is also tasked
with assisting the Chief Executive in supervising the policy bureaus,
ensuring harmonization in policy formulation and implementation, and
supervising specific priority areas of the Chief Executive's policy
agenda. Finally, the Chief Secretary will also be responsible for forging
a better relationship with the Legislative Council and for designing the
Government's legislative program.57
F. Chief Executive in Council
In the British tradition, there is a longstanding practice for a subject to
appeal to the "King (or Queen) in Council" on certain matters. The
council was the Privy Council, the body of persons appointed (by the
58Crown) to advise the sovereign. In a jurisdiction such as Hong Kong,
which retained many aspects of a colonial governance system even today,
the "Chief Executive in Council", retains a residual power to hear appeals
against certain decisions. Most of these rights to appeal (which are in
addition to any legal right applying) are now set down in legislation.
56. The Financial Secretary (FS) will also chair Executive Council Sub-
committees relating to economic, monetary, and financial affairs. At a Q/A session at a
luncheon talk on April 25, 2002, the Chief Secretary (CS) said that:
The idea is that the FS will sit in my subcommittees as a member and I'll sit in
his subcommittee as a member. So we'll know the entire cross-section of the
Hong Kong Government activities as we try to promote a political agenda for
the next five years. It will be more coherent, with a sharper focus, and I think
working for the first time as a real political team in action.
See Tsang, supra note 14.
57. HKSAR Gov'T SECRETARIAT, Organizational Changes in the Government
Secretariat of the Government of the HKSAR Arising from the Accountability System,
GEN. CIRCULAR No.4/2002, JUNE 28, 2002 (describing the specific responsibilities of all
fourteen principal officials) [hereinafter GEN. CIRCULAR No. 4/2002].
58. The height of the influence of the Privy Council was during the Tudor period.
Subsequently its political role was largely transferred to Parliament. Its judicial role
became formalized with the formation of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council,
which continues as the court of final appeal for various former British colonies, such as
New Zealand, to this day.
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Legislators questioned how appeals to the Chief Executive in Council
against decisions of principal officials or their deputies would be handled
under the POAS. Hong Kong ordinances have 689 references to the term
"Chief Executive in Council". Of these, fifty-three references provide for
appeals in particular situations, such as on the decisions of the Director of
Immigration; thirty-two references relates to approval of plans, such as
those under the Town Planning Ordinance; and, the rest relate to the
making of subsidiary legislation, amendment of schedules of primary
legislation and miscellaneous matters. The "Chief Executive in Council"
sits to hear appeals in an administrative and not a judicial capacity. Where
an appeal arises from a decision of a bureau or department, the principal
official who holds the relevant portfolio is given legal advice as to whether
he or she should excuse himself or herself from the particular appeal.59
G. Appointment and Removal of Principal Officials
The Chief Executive -in theory can appoint whom he sees fit as principal
officials. In reality, there are practical constraints. First, candidates have to
go through an integrity and medical check before they are nominated for
appointment.6 ° Second, because the Central People's Government upon
nomination by the Chief Executive actually appoints the principal officials,
the Chief Executive would likely be sensitive to Beijing's views. Third, and
most fundamentally, candidates have to be willing to serve. It has been
reported that several people from the private sector and civil service who
had been asked to serve as principal officials turned down the offer.6'
Civil servants who accept appointments as principal officials under the
POAS (with the exception of the Secretary for the Civil Service) must resign from
the civil service to become effectively full-time political appointees employed
on contract. Non-civil servants join as principal officials on contract. The new
59. This issue was extensively discussed during LegCo scrutiny. It would be
useful to put in place a mechanism to deal with appeals that go to the Chief Executive in
Council against decisions of principal officials to ensure consistency and transparency.
Judicial interpretation provides where an appeal may be made to the Chief Executive in
Council, that administrative remedy is additional to, and not a substitute for, any remedy
by way of judicial review of the original administrative decision. LC Paper
CB(2)1911/01-02(01) (May 10, 2002) at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yrOl-02/english/
hc/subcom/hs51/papers/hs5 lppr.htm.
60. LC Paper CB(2)2075/02-02(02) (May 2002), at http://www.legco.gov.hk/
yr01-02/english/hc/subcom/hs51/papers/hs51_ppr.htm; LC Paper CB(2)2171/01-02,
supra note 47, at paras. 37-40.
61. See, e.g., San ju tou wu gu lu shi bai: Ma Shi Heng dai yi zhong, MING PAO,
June 19, 2002, at Al.
employment packages are no longer linked to the civil service pay scale but
may be reviewed from time to time at the discretion of the Chief Executive.
Principal officials are employed on contract for a term that does not exceed
that of the Chief Executive who nominates them, and their employment may
be terminated at any time without cause or compensation. 62 Article 48(5) of
the Basic Law provides the Chief Executive with the power to recommend
the removal of principal officials to the Central People's Government.
The principal officials' contracts of service have a condition that they
need to uphold the principle of maintaining an impartial civil service
system, the terms of which are laid out in a new Code of Practice. At the
same time, the government released a new General Circular to civil servants
setting out the working relationship between civil servants and principal
officials. The Code also applies to the Director of the Chief Executive's Office
who is not a principal official. The General Circular makes reference to the
Director in spelling out the working relationship between principal officials
and civil servants. 63 These arrangements were put in place in recognition of the
potentially sensitive relationship between civil servants and political
appointees. They are meant to ensure that individual civil servants are not put
in a position that may compromise their integrity, probity, or impartiality.
Former principal officials will be required to obtain the advice of a
special advisory committee appointed by the Chief Executive before
taking up any employment or going into any business within a year of
stepping down from office.64
H. Civil Service Reorganization
The most senior civil servants are now known as "permanent secretaries,"
and their role is to provide full support to the principal officials in formulating,
explaining, and defending policies, as well as securing support of the public
and LegCo. They will run the relevant bureaus and departments. In addition,
they will represent the principal officials at LegCo panels, bills committees,
and at public forums. This will relieve the principal officials of certain tasks
such as internal coordination, administration, and particular LegCo duties to
focus on their priority policy roles.65
62. LC Paper CB(2)2075/02-02(02), supra note 60; LC Paper CB(2)2171/01-02,
supra note 47, at paras. 37-40.
63. LC Paper CB(2)2101/01-02(01) (May 2002), at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr01-
02/englsih/hc/subcom/hs5 lppr.htm; LC Paper CB(2)2171/01-02, supra note 47, at para.
34; LC Paper CB(2)2467/01-02(01) (June 28, 2002), at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yrOl-
02/english/hc/subcom/hs51/papers/hs5 lppr.htm.
64. LC Paper CB(2)2015/01-02, supra note 15, at paras. 134-38.
65. LC Paper CB(2)1711/01-02(01) (Apr. 23, 2002), at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yrOl-
02/english/hc/subcon/hs51/papers/hs5lppr.htm. See also GEN. CIRCULAR No. 4/2002,
annex F (describing the responsibilities of the permanent secretaries).
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More changes are in store. Upon assumption of office, the principal
officials will review the staffing and structure of the policy bureaus. The
purpose of the review, to be completed within twelve months, is to
streamline the structure and relationship between the policy bureaus and
executive departments in the quest for greater efficiency and better
implementation. The review is meant to help ensure that the introduction of
,66the accountability system will prove to be a "cost neutral exercise".
The Secretary for the Civil Service position was designed to ally fears
that the political neutrality of the civil service may be compromised.
Despite being a principal official posting, the Secretary for the Civil
Service will continue to be chosen from among civil servants, and, upon
the end of his or her term of service, he or she can return to the civil
67service in other civil service postings.
V. ACCOUNTABILITY-THEN AND Now
"Accountability" can have several meanings. In the narrowest sense,
"accountability" means simply the obligation to account for or explain one's
actions. In the sense of "administrative accountability", the term refers to
performance and deals with the relationship between subordinates and
superiors. In the still broader sense of "political accountability", the term refers
to the relationship between authorities and the public or its representatives. To
compare accountability under the new system with Hong Kong's previous
system, it is important to understand the sense in which this term is being used.
A. Colonial Legacy
Under the previous system of government in Hong Kong-a legacy of
colonialism-decision-makers were not accountable in a political sense. It
was never thought that decision-makers had to be held accountable to colonial
subjects. Until 1997, Hong Kong had a colonial system of government where
bureaucrats acted effectively as both administrators and ministers. They were
accountable in an administrative sense to their superiors and had to abide by
civil service regulations but they were not accountable politically.68 They
66. LC Paper CB(2)2066/01-02(04), supra note 47, at para. 2.
67. Tung, Speech to LegCo on POAS, April 17, 2002, supra note 4; Suen, Speech
to LegCo, May 29, 2002, supra note 43.
68. Civil service regulations are in the form of subsidiary legislation. The Public
Service (Administration) Order and Public Service (Disciplinary) Regulation spell out
civil service appointments, dismissal, suspension, and disciplinary procedures.
were answerable in the sense that they provided answers to the public
directly and via the legislature.
The fusion of politics and administration in the colonial model of
government downplayed the importance of politics and political participation
in policy-making. At the same time, the top layer of the civil service
was in fact politicized as it also effectively played a political role.
Hong Kong's post-1997 political system adopted much of the colonial
structure. The Basic Law was created in the mid-1980s to enable the
colonial "executive-led" (i.e. civil service-led) system to continue
essentially unchanged. Although relevant articles are somewhat vague,
the Basic Law does not provide for political accountability.
The Basic Law expects that, together with the Chief Executive, civil
servants will continue to play the most important political role in post-
1997 Hong Kong. Article 48(5) refers to a number of the most senior official
posts, most of whom were civil servants, as "principal officials". 69 The
administrative apparatus and the Chief Executive together make up the
"executive authorities", which is the HKSAR Government.70 Although
the Basic Law provides that the HKSAR Government is "accountable"
to the legislature, it does not seem to incorporate the notion of political
accountability. 7' Article 99 makes it clear that "public servants" (a
category that includes civil servants) are responsible to the HKSAR
Government and not to the legislature.72
It is therefore understandable why a large number of civil servants do
not see themselves as being responsible politically.73 Instead, according
to official documents prepared for LegC0, civil servants should only be
"accountable for administrative and managerial mishaps, as well as for
personal misconduct." Noting the existence of a "well-established civil
service appointment, management and disciplinary system," the study
concludes that "it would not be appropriate to ask civil servants to
69. The majority of the principal officials were civil servants. The Director of the
Independent Commission Against Corruption and the Director of Audit were not
employed as civil servants but on contract terms.
70. See BASic LAW, supra note 5, arts. 59-60.
71. See id. art. 64.
72. "Public servants" is a wider term than civil servants and covers legislators, principal
officials, and appointees to public bodies who are not employed on civil service terms, as well
as mainstream civil servants. LC Paper CB(2)1809/01-02(03) (Apr. 29, 2002), at
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yrO1-02/english/hc/sub-com/hs51/papers/hs5 lppr.htm (providing
the official definitions for "civil servants" and "public servants").
73. A University of Hong Kong survey in 1999 of civil servants showed that less than
44.5% of the senior official respondents believed that the civil service should be accountable
to the legislature. Furthermore, 51.4% believed that being accountable did not mean that they
should resign to take responsibility for policy errors, reflecting the civil service's position as a
whole. A majority of 58.9% believed that "executive-led" government meant that the
government could implement policy that had not first been approved by LegCo.
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assume political responsibility" because it "would seriously undermine the
political neutrality of the civil service and the integrity of the civil service
system." 74 Former Secretary for Constitutional Affairs Michael Suen argued:
There are increasing calls for senior civil servants to be held accountable for
policy failures, including calls for some of them to step down. These changes
have shown an inherent mismatch between the civil service status of these
officials and the demands placed on them... . Holding them responsible and
expecting them to step down in the case of serious policy failures is
incompatible with the underlying philosophy of a permanent civil service and
its established appointment and removal system.75
In summary, in the previous system, accountability was equated with
answerability and administrative accountability. That sort of accountability
76
carried no political sanctions.
In announcing the POAS, the Chief Executive sought to strengthen
accountability to the executive by requiring principal officials to be
responsible to him for their policy portfolios. According to the Chief
Executive, principal officials would be: ". . . [A]ccountable to the
Chief Executive for the success or failure of their policy initiatives.
Under the leadership of the Chief Executive, they will be accountable
to the community. Where necessary, the Chief Executive may
terminate their contracts."
77
The accountability as stated, however, is to the Chief Executive and
not to either Hong Kong's elected legislature or to its electorate. The
POAS is therefore not a system that provides for political accountability
in a democratic sense.
The HKSAR Government's position is consistent with the Basic Law.
Under the Basic Law as it is currently drafted, democratic political
accountability is not available. Principal officials are still considered to
be "public servants" and thus not accountable to the legislature. 78 The
Basic Law contains no provision for the legislature to remove a principal
official through a vote of no confidence. LegCo only has power to
74. LC Paper CB(2)194/01-02(01) (Oct. 26, 2001), at http://www.legco.gov.hk/
yrO1-02/english/panels/ca/papers/ca 1030cb2-194-I .pdf.
75. Suen, Speech to LegCo, May 29, 2002, supra note 43. See also Anson Chan,
Speech at the LegCo motion of no confidence on short piling (June 28, 2002) in Official
Record of Proceedings, Legislative Council, at 9317-20.
76. John P. Bums, Accountability and the Senior Civil Service in the HKSAR,
(2002) (paper delivered at the University of Hong Kong).
77. Tung, Speech to LegCo on POAS, April 17, 2002, supra note 4.
78. LC Paper CB(2)693/01-02(01), at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yrO1-02/english/
panels/ca/papers/ca 1217cb2-693-le.
impeach the Chief Executive.7 9 However, the Chief Executive has said that if
LegCo passes a motion of no confidence against a principal official, he would
"consider among other things the circumstances leading to such a motion." 80
The existing constitutional framework did not anticipate the emergence of
professional politicians and the government was unprepared to seek amendment
of the Basic Law. Principal officials under the POAS have thus had to be fitted
within the existing framework of the Basic Law. This has lead to their being
described as-and regarded as---"public servants". It is clear that the new
principal officials, like professional politicians and legislators in other
jurisdictions, are "public servants" in a general sense. But, although they are in
"public service", Hong Kong's new principal officials are not subject to the
rules, norms, and accountability systems applying to civil servants and
executive branch employees within the HKSAR. A key point of the POAS was
to terminate the civil service status of (almost all) the new principal officials.
The next question which arises is, are the new POAS principal officials not
just "generic" public servants, but also "public servants" within the strict
meaning of that term as it is used in the Basic Law. This is really an important
issue only with respect to the eligibility of members of LegCo to serve,
concurrently, as principal officials under the new system. Under the pre-POAS
system, it was clear that LegCo members could not, also, be principal officials.
Under the new system it is less clear-cut that a serving LegCo member is
prohibited from being concurrently appointed as a principal official. Article
79(4) of the Basic Law provides that a legislator is to be disqualified if he
accepts a "govemment appointment" and becomes a public servant. The
question is, are principal officials appointed under the POAS properly to be
regarded as "public servants" within the meaning of the Basic Law? Professor
Ghai has noted that there is some uncertainty about whether certain "principal
officials" (like those created by the POAS who, explicitly, are not civil servants)
are "public servants" within the strict meaning of the Basic Law. That is, to be
a public servant within the strict meaning ofArticle 79 (4) of the Basic Law, is it
mandatory for that principal official to be a mainstream civil servant? If this is a
necessary requirement to be a public servant within the meaning of Article
79(4), then one can argue that a currently serving member of LegCo could be
appointed as a principal official without endangering his or her eligibility to hold
a LegCo seat. Although he or she would have accepted a "government
appointment", he or she would not have become a "public servant" within the
meaning of Article 79(4). Ghai notes the uncertainty about the validity of this
line of reasoning. Good sense thus suggests it would be unwise to attempt to
appoint a legislator as a principal official with portfolio.
81
79. See BASIC LAW, supra note 5, art. 73(9).
80. LC Paper CB(2)1711/01-02(01) (Apr. 23, 2002), supra note 65.
81. YASH GHAI, HONG KONG'S NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 295 (2nd ed. 1999).
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Article 55 of the Basic Law specifically allows legislators to join the
Executive Council. There is, thus, no problem with a legislator also being a
member of the Executive Council-provided the LegCo member does not
have a specific portfolio. Ultimately, Article 55 negates any attempt to draw an
implication from Article 79(4) that such an appointee (without portfolio)
could be considered to be a "public servant' within the meaning of that Article.
B. Accountability to LegCo
Article 64 of the Basic Law provides that the Government is
accountable to LegCo. Specifically, the Government shall:
(i) implement laws passed by the Council already in force;
(ii) present regular policy addresses to the Council;
(iii) answer questions raised by members of the Council; and,
(iv) obtain approval from the Council for taxation and public expenditure.
Thus, the accountability to LegCo on its face is restricted to four areas.
Article 74 further constrains the power of LegCo by limiting legislators'
ability to propose private bills except where they do not relate to public
expenditure, political structure, or the operation of government.
Otherwise, the written consent of the Chief Executive is required before
any such introduction. With respect to public expenditure, LegCo can
only accept or reject proposals from the executive but not amend them.
Articles 50 through 52 of the Basic Law provide that if there is deadlock
over legislation or a budget, the Chief Executive may dissolve LegCo.
Only if the new legislature and the Chief Executive found themselves in
deadlock once more would the Chief Executive have to resign.
Although LegCo's constitutional powers to hold the government
accountable are limited, the Power and Privilege Ordinance gives LegCo
enormous power to investigate possible government wrongdoing. LegCo
invoked this Ordinance in 1994 to investigate the dismissal of a high-ranking
corruption investigator, in 1997 to investigate questionable actions of the
Director of Immigration, in 1998 to investigate the problems associated with
the opening of the Chek Lap Kok airport, and in 2001 to investigate defective
construction. The Ordinance provides the legislature with the power to summon
the Chief Executive and anyone else in the jurisdiction for questioning.
Although motion debates in LegCo carry no legislative effect and are
therefore purely persuasive in nature, motions can be influential if carried.
On both occasions when motions of no confidence against specific officials
were moved, they were highly charged and solemn events where the
executive lobbied hard against them.82 Likewise, in the future, if the legislature
were to pass a motion of no confidence against a principal official, it would
likely be extremely difficult for the person concerned to remain in office.
VI. EVALUATING SYSTEMS OF EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT
Hong Kong's system of government bears a greater structural
resemblance to a presidential system, as in the United States, than to the
ministerial (parliamentary) system used in Britain. That said, the
dominant political-constitutional tradition in Hong Kong is British.
Hong Kong has therefore inherited a somewhat schizophrenic political
personality. To understand how the new system of accountability will
work in Hong Kong, it is important to understand both these political
traditions. To be successful, efforts to reform government accountability
in Hong Kong must understand the real nature of the existing system.
A. Ministerial and Presidential Systems
Official documents do not refer to the POAS as a "ministerial
system" even though public debate and press coverage have done so
and the media typically refer to the new principal officials as
"ministers". Nor is the term "Cabinet" officially used.8 3 The system is
always referred to as the "Principal Officials Accountability System"
or the "Accountability System". The POAS is, nonetheless, a form of
ministerial system, as that term is generally understood. s4 Professional
politicians have taken key positions of public responsibility, and they
have been formed into a governing collective under the leadership of a
chief minister, which in Hong Kong's case is the Chief Executive. In
short, despite the HKSAR Government's careful use of nomenclature,
Hong Kong now has a form of ministerial government.
At the same time, the POAS is not a typical ministerial system because
Hong Kong's ministers are not elected. The general understanding of a
ministerial system includes an expectation that the ministers should be
regularly accountable to the people through some form of popular election.85
82. See discussion supra note 19 for details of the two motions.
83. Nevertheless, the Chief Secretary, at a luncheon talk, used the word "cabinet"
several times. See Tsang, supra note 14.
84. The media often refer to the principal officials under the POAS as "Ministers".
See also THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF POLITICS (lain McLean ed., Oxford
University Press 1996) for the definition of "Minister".
85. This is the essence of popular accountability under a Westminster System of
government modeled on the U.K parliamentary system. The U.S. model uses "ministers" (called
Secretaries, normally) who are not directly elected. But they answer to a popularly elected President
and their appointments and performances in each case are subject to scrutiny by Congress.
[VOL. 4: 127, 2003] Politics Without Democracy
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.
The POAS lacks any institutionalized system of popular (or democratic)
accountability (although principal officials may be able to be dismissed more
readily for poor performance than under the previous system).
The POAS is also not a typical ministerial system because of the way it
reflects certain fundamental features of Hong Kong's inherited governance
structure. Hong Kong, like any long established jurisdiction already has an
established political profile. Short of revolutionary change, political reform
proceeds within the structure of ajurisdiction's political profile.
B. The Origins of Ministerial Government
The concept of ministerial government is rooted in the development of
the modern concept of the Rule of Law, which has developed over a
very long time.86 In Britain, after the loss of the U.S. colonies in the late
eighteenth century, the system of government changed as Parliament
absorbed considerable power from a discredited Monarchy. The resulting
"figurehead" constitutional monarchy continues in Britain to this day. The
essence of the resulting (Westminster) Parliamentary System of Government
(or "Responsible Government") is that the executive government is
formed from within the legislature and is responsible to the legislature. 87 This
was Britain's answer-some decades after the American Revolution-to
the question of how to keep the government of the day in check.
86. When we speak about the Rule of Law, it is often assumed that there is common
agreement on what it means. There is in fact fundamental disagreement about the meaning of
the term within the Common Law world--of which Hong Kong is a part. There is also
disagreement between the Common Law word and other parts of the world with a different
political-legal tradition, such as China. Notwithstanding these differences, there is fairly wide
agreement within the Common Law world (and often beyond) on the basic requirements for
any political-legal system to make a credible claim that the Rule of Law operates within that
system. The Rule of Law concept is widely regarded as having been encapsulated as a
Doctrine of the Common Law by A.V. Dicey in the nineteenth century. Originally, the
concept had been applied principally to mediate the relationship between Monarch and
Parliament. In the wake of the massive social, economic, and political changes wrought by
the Industrial Revolution, it was also used to mediate the relationship between the government
and its citizens. See David Clark, The Many Meanings of the Rule of Law, in LAW,
CAPITALISM AND POWER IN ASIA (Kanishka Jayasuriya ed., 1999). See also, with respect to
the Rule of Law in Hong Kong in particular, Carol Jones, Politics Postponed, in LAW,
CAPrrAuSM AND POWER IN ASIA (Kanishka Jayasuriya ed., 1999).
87. The Doctrine of Responsible Government, which is part of British constitutional
law, states that the entire executive branch of government (civil servants, government
departments, and all members of the cabinet (ministers) should be answerable to the
legislature. The Doctrine also stipulates that ministers must be members of Parliament. See
BEDE HARRIS, ESSENTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 15 (2000).
C. Hong Kong's System of Executive Government
Despite radical developments within Britain itself, these political reforms
were not then exported throughout the British Empire. The British retained
what might be termed the "George III model" as its template for colonial
govemance-a very powerful, centralized executive with a comparatively
weak law-passing legislature plus a separate judiciary. During the
nineteenth century, Britain did allow parliamentary government to develop
to a significant (but still controlled) extent in Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand, for example. In other colonies, though, the executive-led model
prevailed. After World War H, Britain shed most of its colonies although
Hong Kong remained an exception. Right through until the handover in
1997, Hong Kong retained its executive-led system of government, with its
deep roots in the eighteenth century. As discussed earlier, this is the system
of government that the British and the Chinese sought to lock into place
when they were drafting the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law.
Hong Kong is a unique political entity, neither an independent country nor
a typical province or city. In contrast to other British colonies, Hong Kong
did not gain independence in 1997. It is not a nation-state but a special
administrative region of the People's Republic of China. Hong Kong differs
from a typical province, municipality, county, or city because of its extensive
autonomy and ability to deal in external relations, but it is not an independent
entity.88 Likewise, the position of Chief Executive of the HKSAR is unique.
On the one hand, he is able to participate in some international gatherings of
heads of state.89 On the other hand, his position is really similar to that of a
typical large city mayor. Despite his international standing, the Chief
Executive cannot be compared to a national president or a prime minister.
D. Contrasting Systems of Executive Government
Different systems of government seek to enforce responsibility to the
people in different ways. Presidential systems, such as in the United
States, separate the powers of government into legislative, executive, and
judicial institutions to avoid excessive concentrations of power and to
allow each of the arms of government to act as a check and a balance on
the others.90  The overriding concern is to prevent the abuse of
government power.
88. Chapter VII of the Basic Law allows the HKSAR to conduct extensive external
relations that falls short of diplomatic affairs.
89. For example, Hong Kong can be a member of international bodies with a separate
identify from China, such as the World Trade Organization and APEC. Thus, in the case of APEC,
the Chief Executive attends meetings together with other heads of state on an equal footing.
90. In the United States (as in other federal systems) power is also divided between
the central (Federal) and regional (State) governments.
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In parliamentary systems, the executive is responsible to the people
through Parliament. Although the judiciary is independent, the executive
and legislative branches work in concert. The executive government both
resides in Parliament and, of necessity, enjoys majority legislative support.
Should the government lose that support, then, under a parliamentary
system, it will cease to be the government.
Comparing Parliamentary and Presidential Systems 9'
PARLIAMENTARY
All members of the executive-the chief
executive (prime minister) and other
members (ministers)-are members of
the legislature.
The constitutional power of the executive
is vested in the head of state who is either
a monarch (United Kingdom) or a
president (India).
The constitutional power is exercized
by the prime ministers and ministers.
The prime minister is appointed by the head
of state on the basis of having the
confidence and support of the legislature,
and the ministers are appointed by the head
of state upon the prime minister's advice.
The prime minister and ministers collectively
are dependent on the confidence and support
of the legislature to remain in office and, thus,
do not hold office for a fixed term.
The prime minister and ministers are,
both collectively and individually,
accountable to the legislature and
through the legislature to the public.
PRESIDENTIAL
The members of the executive-the chief
executive (president) and other members
(secretaries)-are not also members of
the legislature.
The constitutional power of the executive
is vested in the head of state (president)
who is also the chief executive.
The constitutional power of the executive
is exercized by the president with the
assistance and support of the secretaries.
The president is elected to office by the
public, and the secretaries are appointed
by the president with the approval of the
legislature.
The president is elected to office for a
fixed term and is not dependent on the
confidence and support of the legislature
to remain in office (other than where
formally impeached by the legislature).
The secretaries are accountable to the
president, and the president is accountable
to the public.
91. The table is adapted from Ian Thynne, Accountability: An Elusive but Fundamental
Element of Modem Government, (June 2002) (paper delivered at the University of Hong Kong).
VII. ISSUES ARISING FROM THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POAS
A. The Price of Expediency: Designing and Implementing POAS
The POAS was designed and imposed quickly, without sufficient
input from LegCo, the civil service, and the public. There were only two
and one-half months from the time the POAS was formally announced
to its implementation. No detailed public consultation paper was
released. Instead, the HKSAR Government preferred to use the short
scrutiny process in LegCo through questions and answers with
legislators as a substitute for a more complete consultation. This process
was unfortunately typical of the leadership style of the last few years.
Head of the Central Policy Unit and scholar Siu-kai Lau has called the
Tung administration "a paternalistic regime" and concluded that its
"decision-making style.., is characterized by a top-down policy making
format and limited public consultation."
92
Although there is no doubt that even a more comprehensive
consultation would not have addressed every detail of or concern about
the new system, the lack of thorough discussion, especially within the
civil service and with LegCo, may come back to haunt the Chief
Executive when problems arise because he will be blamed for inadequate
planning. For example, a change to the portfolio structure at the level of
permanent secretaries was found necessary within a month of its
announcement at the Environment, Transport, and Works Bureau.93
Moreover, an early political "crisis" over proposals to "de-list" penny
stocks from the Hong Kong stock exchange during the first month of the
system being in place provides an even clearer picture of the risk in moving
ahead so quickly with a fundamental change of the governance structure.
The key issue which this crisis has highlighted is: who among the principal
officials is responsible and therefore accountable for which functions?
The stock exchange announced proposals for consultation on the
criteria for continuing listing eligibility of stocks on the exchange, which
led to a panic sell-off of micro-cap stocks the following day taking
HK$10 billion off the market. The stock exchange immediately
announced that it would extend the consultation period to avoid
92. Lau, supra note 22, in THE FIRST TUNG CHEE-HWA ADMINISTRATION-THE FIRST
FIVE YEARS OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, supra note 17, at 16.
93. The original bureau structure divided responsibilities between two permanent
secretaries. One looked after environmental issues, and the other transport and works.
The revised proposal put transport responsibilities with environmental issues as it was
felt that the combined responsibilities of transport and works was too large. See May
Sin-mi Hon, Reshuffle of bureau portfolios 'will lighten workload', SOUTH CHINA
MORNING POST, Aug. 2, 2002, at 4.
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confusion and then withdrew the proposals altogether.94  Public
discussions turned on who should be held accountable for not having
foreseen the market reaction. Those involved included the respective
heads of the exchange and the Securities and Futures Commission (the
regulator reporting to the government), the Secretary for Financial
Services and the Treasury and the Financial Secretary, who have various
oversight responsibilities. Within days, LegCo called an urgent meeting
to seek clarification. To diffuse tension, the Financial Secretary sent a
letter to LegCo, prior to the meeting, informing legislators that he had
appointed a two-person panel to investigate and report on the
circumstances leading up to the event and recommend corrective
measures. 95 Legislators questioned the appropriateness of the Financial
Secretary appointing such a panel, pointing out that unless it was
appointed by the Chief Executive, under Hong Kong law, the panel
would not have the proper powers of investigation. Moreover, the
Financial Secretary Was also a party to be investigated.
There are several hundred references to the Financial Secretary in Hong
Kong's statute books. The Financial Secretary's powers and functions
include the supervision and regulation of companies, the Monetary
Authority, and the Securities and Futures Commission. In the past, the
Financial Secretary was defined to mean "the Financial Secretary of the
HKSAR and the Secretary for the'Treasury", meaning that any power of the
Financial Secretary could be exercised by the Secretary for the Treasury.
This made sense because the Secretary for the Treasury reported to the
Financial Secretary under the old hierarchical civil service structure.
With the implementation of the POAS, the Resolution (discussed in Part
I1.) that was passed to effect the transfer of functions from one secretary to
another, the Secretary for the Treasury had been changed to become the
Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury. This newly created
principal official is able to exercise all the powers and functions of the
Financial Secretary. However, these two persons are now equal ranking
political appointees rather than civil servants. The Secretary for Financial
Services and the Treasury no longer reports to the Financial Secretary, yet
the former can exercise all powers and functions of the latter in law. The
94. For a useful summary of the events leading up to the "crisis" see Dao Heng
Bank Group Limited, available at http://webb-site.com/articles/0223a.htm (last visited
March 12, 2002).
95. See Government Press Release (July 31, 2002), at http://www.info.gov.hk/
gia/general/200207/31/0731277.htm.
Resolution did not take the new political situation into account and thus
there is no clear delineation of powers and functions to be exercised by
these two principal officials. This issue was raised during LegCo's scrutiny
of the POAS but there was no clear response from the government.
96
The important task of clearly establishing the powers, functions and duties
of the principal officials could have been done more effectively given more
time. There was also no hanidover period between those who headed bureaus
under the previous system and the new principal officials, which would have
been particularly useful for those appointees who came from the private
sector.97 A more thorough deliberation before implementation of the POAS,
as well as allowing time to prepare for a proper handover of duties to the new
ministers and the permanent secretaries would have engendered greater "buy-
in" to the new policy and a smoother transfer of responsibilities. Better
preparation could also have provided a useful cushion against criticism.
B. Elites and Public Opinion
The Hong Kong policy system before and after 1997 has co-opted the
business and professional classes into a leading role within the power
structure. "During the colonial era, the British had sought to enhance
their legitimacy in the absence of democracy through endorsement from
representatives of the 'business elite'," argues a former head of the
Central Policy Unit, Leo Goodstadt. "Chinese officials ... proved
equally eager to have this group's support, and well before 1997 China
96. LC Paper CB(2)2122/01-02(01), at annex C, 1-2, at http://www.legco.gov.hk/
yrOl-02/english/hc/sub com/hs51/papers/hs5 Lppr.htm (showing textual amendments provided
for in the Resolution relevant to the transfer of statutory functions from the former civil service
Secretary for Financial Services to the new Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury
relating to the Securities and Futures Commission). In legislator Margaret Ng's speech during
the passage of the Resolution on June 19-20, 2002, she said:
The office of Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury will be added to
our statute books by this Resolution. Yet, the simple question, "what powers and
functions does the [Secretary] have?" has no answer. I asked Mr. Suen
[Secretary of Constitutional Affairs] the question. He told me bluntly that the
Government has not yet sorted that out, and will do so only in the coming year.
See Ng, supra note 35.
97. Under the POAS, two bureaus covering financial services and the treasury
were amalgamated. The previous civil service head for financial services became the
principal official for economic development and labor on the July 1, and the former head
of the treasury became the permanent secretary for commerce and industry in another
bureau. There was no handover period for either the principal official (Secretary for
Financial Services and the Treasury), who came from the private sector and took office
on July 1, or the permanent secretary for financial services, who was transferred from the
Housing Department, at the last moment. During a LegCo meeting held on July 31 to
seek clarification on the penny stocks "crisis", Frederick Ma, the principal official, came
under fire for saying it was not his duty to know details of the proposals. See Battered
Ma admits: I'm no wizard, THE STANDARD, Aug. 1, 2002. See also Dao Heng Bank
Group Limited, supra note 94 for a longer discussion.
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ha[d] replaced 'the colonial bureaucracy as the political partner of the
bourgeoisie' and was recruiting a majority of its new political
establishment from the business elite., 98 Tung Chee-hwa was a member
of Hong Kong business elite before he became Chief Executive and his
governing style is often more corporate than political. In fact, the head
of the Central Policy Unit, Lau Siu-kai, had described his attitude
towards politics as "apolitical or even anti-political". 99
In announcing the POAS, the Chief Executive emphasized that the
principal officials "will place importance on public opinion... make
further efforts to gauge public sentiments.., be proactive in facing the
public, and... gaining the trust and support from the public through
delivering results."'00  Upon beginning his second term, the Chief
Executive emphasized that there would be a new style of governance
that would "feel the pulse of the community, take community sentiments
fully into account, and enable different sectors of the community to
participate in the policy making process.
'' l
These statements indicate a degree of acceptance that his government
needs to increase its political sensitivity and policy capacity to reflect
social realities, but it still has yet to be seen whether during his second
term the Chief Executive can craft an agenda and generate public debate
that will resonate with the majority of the people rather than the elites
especially when there is an ideological and value gulf between the elites
and the ordinary people.
C. Power and Pressure Concentrated on the Chief Executive
The Basic Law reflects a political design that downplays the roles of
political parties, elections, and the legislature. With such a concentration
of power in the Chief Executive, the Hong Kong governing system puts
tremendous pressure on one person. The current holder of the post has no
political party structure to rely on and relatively few experienced
politicians and political advisers he can call upon for advice. He had little
experience in public life before 1997. With no public mandate but with a
98. Leo Goodstadt, China and the Selection of Hong Kong Post-Colonial Political
Elite, 163 THE CHINA Q. 721, 721 (2000).
99. Lau Siu-kai, Preface to THE FIRST TUNG CHEE-HWA ADMINISTRATION-THE FIRST
FIVE YEARS OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, supra note 17, at viii-ix.
100. Tung, Speech to LegCo on the POAS, April 17, 2002, supra note 4.
101. Tung Chee-hwa, Speech on Assuming his Second Term Office (July 1, 2002),
at http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200207/01/0701080.htm.
high concentration of power, the Chief Executive's personal style and
behavior in exercising power becomes critical to how the public relates to
him as the head of the HKSAR Government.
D. Governing Style
The Chief Executive has said he hopes the POAS will "strengthen
solidarity, to enhance internal working relationship and to smooth
cooperation"' 0 2 and "bring about a new style of governance".
0 3
Nevertheless, he is likely to find that his personal style in dealing with the
new principal officials and the civil service will still matter a great deal.
E. Pressure to Perform
The stated objectives for the POAS are to enhance political
accountability, maintain a professional civil service, and improve the
quality and effectiveness of government policies. With heightened
public expectations, the new team will be under tremendous pressure to
perform. Responding to this growing pressure, the Chief Executive has
delayed his annual policy address usually scheduled for the first
Wednesday in October to coincide with the start of the new LegCo
session after the summer recess to mid-January 2003 to give him and his
new team time to formulate policy priorities.
Yet, time may not be on the side of the new governing team. Global
economic conditions are far from stable. Local conditions remain tough,
with unemployment standing at 7.7 percent in July 2002. Hong Kong
has seen more than foriy-four months of continuous deflation. The
government is running a substantial budget deficit although it still has
healthy reserves."°4 Markets are likely to remain volatile as Hong Kong
attempts to restructure itself into a full-service economy requiring a
higher skilled workforce.
Besides thinking of new policies, the government has already had to
deal with an unexpected and sudden "crisis" arising from the stock
exchange's proposal to "de-list" penny stocks,'0 5 which tested the
competence of the Financial Secretary and the Secretary for Financial
Services and the Treasury-the two top principal officials responsible
for financial matters. Moreover, the respective heads of the Securities
and Futures Commission as well the stock exchange are likewise
102. Tung, Speech to LegCo on POAS, April 17, 2002, supra note 4.
103. Id.
104. See Hong Kong's Special Administrative Region Government 2002-03
Budget, available at http://www.budget.gov.hk/eindex.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2003).
105. See discussion supra Part VII.A.
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implicated. Thus, within the first month of implementing the POAS,
Hong Kong's heavyweights in financial matters have all been embroiled
in a major problem with local and international repercussions.
F. Policy Uncertainty
The Chief Executive needs to manage his new principal officials to
ensure a unified front and produce policies that are well-integrated
across all policy areas. This is particularly difficult, however, for two
reasons. First, there is no party system that unites them. Second,
because they did not come to power through elections, they lack any
mandate from the people to govern according to values and policies
annunciated during an election campaign.
Recruitment of the principal officials took place without an
institutionalized political party system that in other jurisdictions would
offer the public predictability about the leaders' values and policy
objectives. In Hong Kong, these values and objectives are tied to the
personal preferences of the Chief Executive and principal officials. This
creates a degree of uncertainty for the political environment, as the public
has no way to predict the policy preferences of the principal officials.
Furthermore, the preferences of one principal official may affect the
portfolio of another, which could cause not only rivalry but also
confusion, thereby affecting the credibility of the government as a whole.
Some principal officials from the private sector created controversy
within days of their appointment. The Secretary for Financial Services
and the Treasury, for example, appeared to have overstepped his
jurisdiction by asserting his preferences on whether the Hong Kong
Stock Exchange should keep its listing committee and even expressed
his personal preference on the exchange's opening hours. °6 The
Secretary for the Environment, Transport, and Works said that she had
been liaising informally with Guangdong authorities on a cross-border
emissions trading scheme even before she formally took office and had
time to speak to colleagues responsible for energy.' °7 Moreover, a war
106. Enoch Yiu, U-turn on listing committee, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, July 4,
2002, at 1. See also Real Problem Dodged, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, July 5, 2002,
at 17 for a commentary on the Secretary's remarks; Listing Chaos: July 28, 2002, at
http://webb-site.com/articles/listingchaos.htm.
107. Cheung Chi-fai, Cross-border Pollution Scheme 'in 3 years', SOUTH CHINA
MORNING POST, July 11, 2002, at 2. The Secretary only took up her post formally on
August 1, 2002.
of words broke out between Executive Councilor and legislator, James
Tien, and the Secretary for Education and Manpower, Arthur Li. On
July 23, Tien said it was "dangerous" that some principal officials were
speaking out before they fully understood their portfolios. As chair of
the Liberal Party, he also said that if policy was not first properly
discussed in the Executive Council, the principal officials could not
count on his party's support for LegCo votes. Li said on August 1 that
he had the right to voice his own opinions and said that: "Mr. Tien is of
course entitled to his own personal opinions. And his personal opinions
are not government policies."'
0 8
No doubt the principal officials, particularly those who did not come
from the civil service, feel the need to make a mark early on, but "their
first priority", according to the Chief Secretary, is "to draw up a five-year
plan for their areas of responsibility"'' 09 and gain internal support before
going public. Careless remarks may ruffle colleagues' feathers as well as
cause confusion. The Chief Secretary Donald Tsang commented,
These plans will need to be approved by the Chief Executive-in-Council. Before
that, they will have to be argued out in ExCo sub-committees chaired by the
Chief Secretary or Financial Secretary. So plans and priorities will have been
exhaustively sieved and sifted even before they reach the full "Cabinet". 
110
G. Policy Making Mechanisms
The Chief Executive has proposed new mechanisms to improve
government policy making. These include:
(a) Putting in place "an effective opinion survey system to ensure the highest
level of Government is aware of community attitudes, sensitivity, and
reaction to policy initiatives,,;III
(b) Strengthening the role of the Central Policy Unit in gauging community
views and sentiments; 112 and,
(c) Reviewing and revising "the structure covering over 400 advisory boards
and committees, so that the organizational arrangements will enable us to
consolidate the views and contributions of different sectors including the
political, business, academic, and grass-root sectors, among others. '"113
108. Ambrose Leung, Tung's Recruits Told to Button Lips, SOUTH CHINA MORNING
POST, July 24, 2002, at 4; Na Kang-chung, Outspoken Minister to Stick to His Guns,
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 2, 2002, at 4.
109. Tsang, supra note 14.
110. Id.
11l. Tung, supra note 3, at 5.
112. Tung Chee-hwa, Speech delivered at the Second Term Government Swearing-in
Ceremony (July 1, 2002), at http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200207/01/0701080.htm.
113. Id. The vast array of government advisory committees could be consolidated.
Although they perform useful tasks, many observers believe that the benefits they produce
do not always match the demands they make on both officials and private citizens.
Substantial benefits may be possible by rationalizing and sharpening their roles.
[VOL. 4: 127, 2003] Politics Without Democracy
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.
The Chief Secretary noted that the government would not only strengthen
the Central Policy Unit but also tap into research institutes, universities, and
think-tanks in Hong Kong: "By necessity, there will be more research into
individual policies when principal officials will be held personally
accountable for his end results."' 1 4  His statement acknowledged that
government policies might not have been adequately researched in the past." 5
Better research and more comprehensive surveys of public opinion,
however, are not sufficient in themselves unless the whole policy making,
consultation, and implementation process works better to generate true
community consensus-something the Chief Executive and his principal
officials will have to prove that they are capable of doing.
H. Relationship With the Media
It has often been remarked that the Chief Executive frequently seems
uncomfortable with the media. In his announcement of the POAS, for
example, Tung complained that the media was "increasingly progressive and
aggressive" subjecting the government to "increasing public scrutiny and
pressure." ' 16 This attitude reflects his dismay with the inability to capitalize
on opportunities to sell and defend his policies. No doubt the Chief Executive
will expect his principal officials to do most of the talking to the media, but as
head of government he still needs to cultivate a direct relationship with both
the local and the international media because it is through them that Hong
Kong is presented to the public and to the international community. Whether it
is fairly reasoned or not, observers may often use the personal style of the top
political leader as a reference to measure the place itself. The media skills of his
principal officials, particularly those from the private sector, will also be tested.
L Relationship With the Legislature
The Chief Executive has also been reluctant to interact with LegCo
directly in open sessions. Important announcements have not always been
made in the legislature. For example, it would have been appropriate for the
Chief Executive to have announced his change of housing target in LegCo,
with the relevant officials in attendance, as well as announcing his new line-
114. Tsang, supra note 14.
115. See, e.g., CivIc EXCHANGE, HONG KONG, SUSTAINABILITY TRANSPORT IN HONG
KONG: DIRECTIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES, ch. 7 (June 2002), at http://www.civic-exchange.org
for a discussion of the problems of policy decision making in Hong Kong in the transport area.
116. Tung, Speech to LegCo on POAS, April 17, 2002, supra note 4.
up of principal officials in LegCo instead of holding a press conference. By
avoiding making important announcements in LegCo, the Chief Executive
leaves the impression that he would prefer not to be questioned by
legislators. With LegCo having a stronger public mandate than the Chief
Executive, signs of reluctance on his part towards the legislature may be
interpreted as being disrespectful of an elected institution. 17
To achieve the POAS's goal of strengthening the "working relationship
between the Executive and the Legislature,"' 18 the Chief Executive will have
to overcome the reservations he may have with LegCo. The government
could develop a convention for the Chief Executive and the principal officials
to go to LegCo to make important government announcements and take
questions before any press briefings so as to acknowledge LegCo's role as
Hong Kong's representative body." 19 This would better reflect Hong Kong's
British political-constitutional tradition although it may appear unusual when
viewed from the perspective of a U.S.-presidential system.
When LegCo returns from its summer recess, legislators will also have
to consider how they may wish to reorganize their panels to reflect the
new structure of the policy bureaus. This will be another early test of
executive-legislative relationship stemming from the POAS. In turn, the
frequency of attendance at LegCo meetings by the principal officials is
likely to be used by legislators as an indicator of how willing the
principal officials are to engage the legislature.
J. Party Politics and Alliances
The Basic Law is silent on whether the Chief Executive can be a
member of a political party. However, the Chief Executive Election
Ordinance provides that he should not have any party affiliation. 20
The significance of the inclusion of two party chairmen in the new
Executive Council remains to be seen. In one respect, the Chief Executive
will have access to first-hand advice on working more successfully with
LegCo.12 1 A "consensus" has also been reached between the government
117. All sixty seats are elected. Twenty-four seats are directly elected by
geographical constituencies, thirty seats by functional constituencies, and six seats by the
same 800-member election committee that would have returned the Chief Executive had
the selection for the second term been contested.
118. Tung, Speech to LegCo on the POAS, April 17, 2002, supra note 4.
119. Lo Shiu Hing, Constitutional Conventions and Ministerial Accountability in
Hong Kong (June 3, 2002) (paper delivered at the University of Hong Kong) (providing
a useful discussion on the subject).
120. See Chief Executive Ordinance § 31 (requiring the winning candidate to
declare that he is not a member of any political party).
121. Tam Yiu-chung, a member of the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of
Hong Kong, was both a member of LegCo and the Executive Council during the Chief
Executive's first term of office.
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and the two party chairmen and the other three Executive Councilors
without portfolios to take an active part in the early stages of the
policy-making process.12 It will be interesting to watch how these two
members reconcile their requirement to abide by the rule of collective
responsibility 123 for government policies made after July 1, 2002 with
their role as party leaders.
Nevertheless, the Chief Executive cannot take for granted that the
three legislators can or will always secure votes of their own political
parties or fellow trade unionists. Although the three Executive
Councilors will have to vote for all government motions, bills, and
expenditure proposals, their members and affiliates do not have to do so.
For example, in July 2000, the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment
of Hong Kong legislators, despite one of theparty's senior members
sitting on the Executive Council and strong lobbying efforts by the
government, voted for the motion of no confidence related to defective
public housing construction.1 24  Thus, although the chairman of the
Liberal Party has said that due to his role as a member of the Executive
Council, the Liberal Party would continue to air its opinions in LegCo,
"but the difference [from the past] is that it will, in the end, cast its votes
in support of the government.' ' 125 He has also said that the other seven
Liberal Party members in LegCo could apply for "exemptions" from the
party line if it clashed with their constituency interests."'
' 26
Hong Kong's political parties and groupings may be said to be divided
along two fault lines: on socio-economic policy and on the pace of
democratization. Although the Chief Executive has appointed representatives
with socio-economic views that vary from his, he was unwilling to include
legislators who prefer a faster pace of democratic reform. '
27
122. Ambrose Leung and Angela Li, Tung's pledge on policy-making, SOUTH
CHINA MORNING POST, July 29, 2002. In that report, Tsang Yok-sing, the chairman of
the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong was quoted as saying: "A
consensus has been reached among the ministers and the permanent secretaries that we
will be able to participate in the policy formulation at a very early stage." Id.
123. See discussion supra Part IV.
124. Tam Yiu-chung voted against, but his party voted in favor of the motion of
no confidence.
125. Ambrose Leung, Liberals beg to differ, but will still back government policy,
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, July 24, 2002, at 4.
126. Angela Li, I'll quit or be fired if no Liberal Party proposal accepted, says
James Tien, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 5, 2002, at 6. In that report, Tien said
that: "I have told Mr. Tung that most likely, such exemptions will be limited to one or
two members of our party. Mr. Tung certainly finds it all right." Id.
127. The three legislators on the new Executive Council also have good relations in Beijing.
The political parties and groupings in LegCo have come together on
several occasions in the past, most notably to lobby on budgetary
issues. 2 8 A likely effect of the addition of party leaders to the Executive
Council is a reduction of future broad cross-party alliances in LegCo to
pressure the government.
The participation in government of leaders from the Liberal Party and
the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong may lead to
greater cooperation between those two parties. James Tien of the
Liberal Party has already noted that the two parties formed "a ruling
coalition in LegCo."'' 29  Although both are conservative on political
reform, their political constituencies and their policy preferences on
socio-economic issues are considerably different. Nevertheless, their
cooperation in Executive Council may help them to join forces formally
or informally in the 2004 or future LegCo elections to compete with the
Democratic Party, the Frontier, and the Association of Democracy and
People's Livelihood.130
K. New Governing Coalition
The ruling elite are likely to look for opportunities to build a power
base in the districts. Central Policy Unit head Lau Sui-kai has publicly
advised the Chief Executive to develop political allies and build political
organizations. The Chief Executive can do this in part through his
appointments of up to twenty-five percent of the members of the
eighteen district councils.' 3
1
The principal officials could well spend more time in the districts
with district councilors and local community organizations. This will
enable them to get input from the public and to build district-based
constituencies. Unlike elected representatives, principal officials have
real power to respond directly to public demands. By developing
direct connections in the community, they will also be able to compete
head-to-head with the directly elected legislators in the political
popularity stakes.
The principal officials are likely to influence appointments to the
government's vast array of advisory bodies and committees, as well as
128. The parties and groups came together to put pressure on the government, for
example, on the 2002-03 Budget not to raise taxes.
129. Leung, supra note 125, at 4.
130. James Tien of the Liberal Party has so far said that the parties have not
considered cooperation and that "it would surely not happen in 2004." Id. at 4.
131. Seventy-five percent of the seats on the District Councils are elected by
universal suffrage. The next District Council election will be in September 2003.
Immediately after the election the Chief Executive can make appointments to twenty-
five percent of the seats.
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powerful institutions with executive power, such as the boards of the
Urban Renewal Authority, the Hospital Authority, and the Airport
Authority. These will provide further opportunities for them to
strengthen their networks in the community.
L. Challenge to the "Opposition"
A more politically aggressive ruling elite presents a substantial
challenge to the "opposition" in LegCo, in particular the Democratic
Party and the Frontier, whose members have been among the most
popular politicians in Hong Kong for many years (although recent
surveys show a steady decline in their popularity).132 They will need to
respond with innovative strategies. They might offer alternative
development strategies to those of the government, thereby forcing a
wider and deeper debate about public policy.
M. Political Neutrality and the Civil Service
While the POAS puts an end to "executive-led" government by civil
servants, official pronouncements continue to emphasize the need to
maintain the integrity and neutrality of the civil service. The Code of
Practice for principal officials and the composite Circular to civil
servants133 explicitly state that principal officials must observe and
promote the political neutrality of civil servants.134 These documents
indicate that there has been some negotiation between the Chief
Executive and the civil service on what is considered acceptable
behavior of principal officials towards civil servants.
Nevertheless, for the principles of integrity and neutrality to be
properly safeguarded, there must be clear demarcation of functions
between the principal officials and the most senior civil servants. It is
unclear at present how the work of the permanent secretaries under the
POAS will differ from such work in the previous system. The
permanent secretaries will still "formulate and implement policies, listen
132. THE HONG KONG TRANSITION PROJECT, THE FIRST FIVE YEARS-FLOUNDERING
GOVERNMENT, FLOUNDERING DEMOCRACY? (May 2002), at http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/-hktp.
133. See discussions supra Parts IV.G.-H.
134. The Circular could also be renamed the Civil Service Code to give it the same
gravity as the Code of Practice for Principal Officials. Moreover, in Britain, there is
debate about legislation so that the values of a permanent, neutral, professional, and
impartial civil service could have the protection of law.
to the views of the public and LegCo, explain policies to these respective
groups, respond to questions raised and gain support from different
quarters for government policies." 135 However, permanent secretaries
are also expected to "defend" government policies.' 3
6
The permanent secretaries may well attend most of the LegCo
meetings and public forums to "relieve the principal officials from...
certain LegCo duties, so that they can focus on their priority policy
roles."' 137  With so much official emphasis on the principal officials
coming up with the right policies, the pressure on permanent secretaries
can only mount.
In Westminster executive-government models, permanent secretaries
may appear before parliament to explain government policies but are not
required to defend them, as that would be seen to contradict the
principles of neutrality and accountability through the ministers.' 38 An
explanation describes what the policy is and how it works, whereas a
policy defense requires justification of the rationale and the values
behind the policy. The distinction may be hard for both the principal
officials and the permanent secretaries to draw. The principal officials
may well see defense of government policy as just a part of explaining
them. The permanent secretaries, who are used to playing
administrative-political roles, are used to defending policies. But having
to defend policies publicly will make civil servants appear to be playing
partisan politics. To protect the political neutrality of a permanent civil
service, both the principal officials and Livil service need to give this
aspect further consideration.
N. Rebuilding Relations With the Civil Service
The Chief Executive also needs to rebuild battered relations with the
civil service. As one commentator has noted, "the ministerial system
introduced ostensibly to enhance accountability, has effectively relieved
the civil servants of governing power. By bringing in 'outsiders' to help
him lord over the mandarins who had proved to be troublesome during
his first term, Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa has staged a silent coup
with Beijing's blessing."'' 39
135. Tung, Speech to LegCo on POAS, 17 April 17, 2002, supra note 4.
136. LC Paper CB(2)711/01-02(01), at para. 18(a) (Apr. 23, 2002), at
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yrOl-02/englishlhc/subcom/hs5ihs5 l-ppr.htm.
137. Id.
138. SYNERGYNET, HOW TO TAKE GOVERNANCE REFORM FORWARD?
ACCOUNTABILITY TO WHOM AND How? (June 2002), at http://www.synergynet.org.hk.
See also Burns, supra note 76.
139. Anthony Cheung, Guidelines needed to negotiate change, SOUTH CHINA
MORNING POST, July 20, 2002, at 12.
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The Chief Executive and the new principal officials still depend on the
civil servants to help with policy formulation and implementation. Civil
servants have a litany of complaints. Senior civil servants, including
some who are now principal officials, believed the Chief Executive had
not adequately consulted them on the POAS. Many permanent secretaries
and their deputies have complained they were not consulted about the
last-minute rearrangement of the policy bureaus. Rank and file civil
servants remain angry because they feel they have been used as
scapegoats. There is, in the difficult economic climate of the last several
years, significant popular unease about, and resentment towards, the way
civil servants seem protected from the harsh economic winds affecting
so many others. In response, the HKSAR Government has now moved
to cut the pay of civil servants. Many civil servants see this initiative as
being as much political (playing to the public) as economic. The civil
servants also resent the government's determination to implement this
pay cut legislatively. The civil servants were willing to negotiate to
reduce pay and resented the decision of top policy makers resort to
legislation. With about seventy percent of the civil service belonging to
more than 200 staff associations or unions, a militant civil service could
become a serious opposition force to the executive. 140
In a novel move, the HKSAR Government put together for more than
14,000 middle and senior ranking civil servants a specially designed and
facilitated forum for team building and to sharpen their focus "in
appreciating and tackling the challenges of governance in modern age
Hong Kong." 141 The forum had apparently been in the making for eight
months prior to the event. It was designed to help civil servants gain a
better understanding of: (a) how global competition has impacted on Hong
140. There are approximately 184,000 civil servants in Hong Kong. The service
had been downsized by seven percent from about 198,000 in March 2000. More than
30,000 civil servants and their families took to the streets to protest on July 7, 2002
against the use of legislation to cut their pay. Thus, despite passing the legislation the
following week, relations remain tense today. See id. for a useful summary of the civil
pay cut saga.
141. The forum was entitled "Civil Management Forum-A World-class
Government for Asia's World City" held on Aug. 26-29, 2002. See Press Release,
HSKAR Government, Speech by the Chief Secretary for Administration (Aug. 26,
2002), at http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200208/26/0826081I/htm. See also Press
Release, HSKAR Government, FS urges civil servants to embrace '3R's' in government
(Aug. 26, 2002), at http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200208/26/0826183.htm (speech
by the Financial Secretary); Press Release, HSKAR Government, Civil service plays a
critical role in world city vision: CS (Aug. 26, 2002), at http://www.info.gov.hk/
gia/general/200208/26/0826176.htm.
Kong; (b) the challenges and opportunities facing the community; (c) the
impact of these on the government; and, (d) the role of civil servants in the
Hong Kong of today. Attempts to use facilitation techniques to regain the
civil service's esprit de corp are undoubtedly helpful but they need to be a
part of developing an overall policy to make the governing system truly
transparent, responsible, and accountable.
VIII. BEST PRACTICE MINISTERIAL MODEL FOR HONG KONG
This section sets down a range of primary benchmarks for the
operation of what might be termed a "Model Ministerial System". By
drawing on the wide experience of other jurisdictions with the operation
of ministerial systems, it is possible to put together a "best practice"
model. This section provides a summary of such a model. This model
provides one useful tool for observing and evaluating the future
operation of the POAS.
Hong Kong's new POAS is unique. It is neither presidential nor
parliamentary in structure. The POAS is still, in essence, a ministerial
system-but one lacking any direct, electoral accountability. 142 It retains
the other hallmarks of a full ministerial system. It particular, it comprises
a group of avowedly professional politicians led by a chief minister who
has stated unequivocally that his new set of principal officials are to be
accountable to him.
Despite the lack of any electoral accountability with the POAS, it is
still entirely proper that the new system be open to and subject to
benchmarking. The lack of suitable electoral checks and balances
suggests an even greater need than usual for establishing standards as a
means by which to measure the POAS in operation.
A. Benchmarking Ministerial Systems
The following outline draws on a review of systems operating within both
presidential and parliamentary frameworks. It summarizes best-practice,
operational principles from the two principal systems of executive
government. This inventory is not meant to be exhaustive. It does seek to
identify, in precise' form, certain key requirements for choosing, monitoring
and dismissing ministers in a transparent and effective way.
142. Voters in Hong Kong will have an opportunity, to an extent, to express their
views on the POAS at the next LegCo elections due in 2004. This is especially so now
that the leaders of two of the main LegCo parties (the Democratic Alliance for the
Betterment of Hong Kong and the Liberal Party) have aligned themselves so closely with
the POAS by becoming, effectively, members of the new "proto-cabinet" within the
Executive Council. See discussion supra Part IV.
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For a ministerial system to achieve good standing in terms of integrity,
effectiveness and openness, the following requirements must all be met:
" Ministers must satisfy key integrity, competence, and suitability assessments.
" Ministers should be dismissed/resign from their portfolio for any serious mal-
administration, fraud, negligence, conflict of interest, corrupt practice, or breach
of the ministerial Code of Conduct [see below]. This requirement covers dismissal
both for direct ministerial policy blunders and cases of significant operational or
administrative blunders within a department controlled by a minister.
" Ministers should be accountable or responsible to their superiors, peers in
the Legislature, and ultimately to the voters or the people generally through
a system of checks and balances.
" Most ministers will be the legal head of at least one government department
but ministers must not force the civil service to act in a corrupt or politically
partisan manner.
" Decisions on any significant criminal prosecution should be made by an
entity independent of the ministry and the police. As a general rule, the
government should not pay for or underwrite, directly or indirectly, any
civil action taken by a minister (for example in defamation).
" Ministers should conduct themselves in their private capacity so as to
provide a good example. Ministers should strive to avoid intemperate or
scandalous behavior in their private life. Ministers who fail to maintain
such standards of general behavior may be judged as unfit to continue as a
minister especially if their inferior general behavior seriously impedes their
performance as a minister.
* All ministerial conduct, decisions, and documentation must be subject to
scrutiny by other political institutions and personnel, courts, tribunals, the
media and the public generally. All ministers must make themselves
available to answer questions about their performance as ministers to the
appropriate scrutinizing bodies.
" Ministers must be candid and direct in responding to appropriate enquiries.
They must, at all times, avoid deceitfulness in dealing with such enquiries.
B. Ministerial Code of Conduct
Many jurisdictions with ministerial systems have ministerial codes of
conduct or practice. 143 Often these codes have been created in response
to significant public outcry about failures by ministers to resign after
misconduct or major policy failures. Governments have felt compelled
to set down express standards of performance and behavior. Typically,
they have done so to curb public outrage-and reduce the risk of
possible electoral defeat.
143. Australia provides a case in point. The Code of Practice set out in this section draws
on the Ministerial Code applied to members of cabinet by the current government in Australia.
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The Hong Kong solution of devising a Code of Practice for principal
officials as a part of their employment contract with the government is far
from ideal. The HKSAR Government should consider creating, if not
legislating, a clear, stand alone ministerial Code of Practice for the sake of
good administration, transparency, and accountability. Further, the present
General Circular, which also serves to spell out the relationship between the
principal officials and the civil service, would also be better if it were
legislated as a Code of Conduct for civil servants. The respective standards
of performance and behavior would then be significantly clearer.
The principal purpose of a ministerial Code of Practice is to prohibit any
form of conduct by ministers that creates a conflict of interest between their
ministerial duties or privileges and the private interests of ministers and their
near family. The following list encapsulates certain primary requirements
for a firm and effective ministerial Code of Practice.
0 A minister and his/her family must divest themselves of any
shareholdings, business relationships, etc. that fall within the subject areas
of the particular portfolio held by the minister;
* No minister shall assist in any way in obtaining employment for any
member of his/her family or friends within the government;
0 A minister must not accept any fringe benefit as part of his/her ministerial
position that is not part of his/her normal government employment
package, nor shall s/he use her/his ministerial privileges unfairly for
her/his own benefit or that of her/his family; and,
0 A minister and his/her near family must not profit or benefit in any improper
way from their ministerial position after s/he ceases to be a minister.
The Code of Practice should prohibit any discrimination based on a
minister's religious, sexual, or cultural preferences (unless they seriously
impede the performance of their ministerial duties).
IX. CONCLUSION
The Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) commenced on July 2, 1997 when
Thailand's currency, previously linked to the U.S. dollar, collapsed. This was
one day after British Hong Kong became the HKSAR. The AFC had immediate
and powerful economic effects within the region and for some countries
including Indonesia, Thailand, and South Korea, its impact was devastating.
Many countries responded with legislative and related reforms designed to
improve the operation of their banking systems and to strengthen corporate
govemance. These economic-inffrastructure reforms are ongoing within the region.
The AFC also sparked political reform in the region. Major political-
constitutional reforms have now been put in place in, for example,
Thailand and Indonesia. There have been political-control shifts in
South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. Also, the AFC indirectly
triggered fundamental clashes within Malaysia's traditional ruling party.
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In most respects, Hong Kong managed to cope with the AFC better
than many other countries. The strength of the banking and legal systems
provide some of the explanation. The crisis has, nevertheless, highlighted
various weaknesses in the HKSAR's basic economic infrastructure. The
Hong Kong way of doing business, with its excessive reliance on
networks when making decisions on major projects, for example, has
already been noted supra in Part III.
As with other jurisdictions in the region, the crisis also underlined flaws in
Hong Kong's political system. As noted supra in Part II., the scope for political
reform in the HKSAR is constrained by the political reality that the Hong
Kong is now a comparatively free and wealthy enclave within the largest
one-party state the world has ever seen. Beijing ultimately has the power to
denote the dimensions of the political zone in which Hong Kong operates.
Despite these constraints, Hong Kong has now moved, albeit somewhat
later than several other jurisdictions, to address some of the flaws in its
political structure highlighted by events which have unfolded since mid-
1997. The POAS (or at least a precursor thereto) has been on the reform-
agenda since 2000. Now it has arrived, formulated and implemented with
something of a gust over a short period of a few months.
It is clear that the POAS does represent an important milestone in Hong
Kong's political evolution. For the first time in its free-port history, Hong
Kong has dropped its reliance on an executive led (that is, civil service run)
system of government. Now it is has a ministerial system of government
run by professional politicians. True, the POAS does not deliver the sort of
political accountability one normally associates with a ministerial system,
but it has severed Hong Kong's dependence on a colonial-style mode of
governance and replaced it with a model far more likely to enhance the
development of a professional political class within the HKSAR.
The POAS reform initiative has also been restrained by the Basic Law. It
was, the reformers clearly decided, axiomatic that the introduction of the
POAS should not require any formal amendment of Hong Kong's hallowed
Basic Law. Any sort of formal amendment of the Basic Law is a highly
sensitive political issue for a variety of reasons. All the changes wrought by
the POAS initiative have therefore had to fit within the existing four comers
of the Basic Law. As it happens, the Basic Law was drafted (by mutual
agreement between Britain and China) so as to try and retain, as far as
possible, the old colonial governance model the HKSAR inherited from
British Hong Kong. The POAS reforms, it is widely agreed, are compatible
with the letter of the Basic Law. It is also widely agreed that they run counter
to the spirit of the Basic Law insofar as they have shifted Hong Kong
significantly away from its previous, accepted form of governance. Finally, it
is clear that Beijing has put aside its prior preferences and endorsed the need
for significant change in Hong Kong's system of Executive Government.
Certain aspects of the POAS reform relate to the fact that it has taken
place within Hong Kong's colonial, hybrid presidential-parliamentary
tradition. It was that tradition which ensured that Hong Kong's civil servant
"politicians" were never accountable in the "lose-your-job" sense to the
local legislature. The lack of any formal political accountability of the new
principal officials to LegCo is consistent with this custom-and with the
Basic Law. That said, it is widely believed that, were LegCo to pass a
motion of no-confidence in a particular principal official, that person would
find it very hard to retain his or her position.
Unfortunately, the POAS has been developed and put into service with
immoderate haste. The costs of moving so quickly became apparent within
the first month of the new system's operation. The "penny-stock" mess is,
in significant part, a product of the uncommon speed with which the POAS
came into being. New principal officials had to hit the ground running.
They have enjoyed practically no "learning curve" space and, perhaps even
more crucially, no-one seems sure, in certain vital areas, just who is
responsible for what within the new team. It seems likely the POAS is
going to see further similar stumbles. Further, the world can expect the
Hong Kong media, one of the freest in the region (and easily the largest, per
capita) to be on hand to capture every alleged bungle, frame by frame.
The "bedding down" period for the POAS looks likely to be lengthy.
Apart from the problem of inexperience and hasty implementation stresses
just noted, the system has put together a coterie of politicians who, at the
same time, have to work as a team while keeping a sharp eye on their own
interests. No longer can the principal officials rely on their civil service
status with its guaranteed employment as their career-anchor. Now, those
officials need to "re-apply" for their own jobs at least every five years.
Balancing personal needs and ambitions with the necessity of pulling
together as a team will be far from easy-especially for people mostly
facing a challenge of this order for the first time in their lives.'"
Another challenge will be settling down the relationship between
Hong Kong's new set of professional politicians and a currently
unsettled, and indeed, grumpy, Civil Service. The way in which the
144. Even professional politicians like Gordon Brown and Tony Blair in the United
Kingdom have difficulty managing this tension despite having had years of experience
dealing with the challenge and being able to call on deeply embedded party learning.
Developed political parties also have "minders" whose task it is to defuse damaging
spasms of rivalry. Hong Kong's new professional politicians are going to have to get by
without having access to this level of political-party infrastructure.
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government has handled the pay cut for civil servants has aggravated
relations already made tense by the hurried introduction of the POAS.
Concerns also remain about how the introduction of the POAS may
impact on the political neutrality of the Civil Service.
The lack of proper democratic accountability within the POAS is clearly a
significant drawback yet somewhat unexpectedly, it is this lack of
accountability that makes the job of the new principal officials that much
more difficult. Officials lack democratic legitimacy and all of Hong Kong
knows this-not least of all, the principal officials themselves. This means
they could be held to a higher standard of performance in the court of public
opinion-whose principal caretaker is the Hong Kong media. True, they do
not have to face the voters regularly, but if they lose popular favor, they
have no mandate to fall back on. They cannot delay a day of reckoning by
saying, "I was chosen by the people to do the best I can-and I will face the
people again come the next election and they can make their decision based
on the totality of my performance during my period of office."
The POAS has incorporated certain elements that are designed to try and
improve the working relationship between the Executive Government and
LegCo. These include the recruitment of two pro-government, LegCo party
leaders into the Executive Council. They are not (and likely cannot be)
principal officials. They are more like ministers-without-portfolio. This
move seems designed to link the Executive Government to some sort of
working majority within LegCo. This may assist the government to a
degree. It also has introduced party politics quite explicitly into the
Executive Council. This is another (POAS-driven) first for Hong Kong.
Overall, however, the government now seems by these moves to have
put even greater distance between itself and the (broadly termed)
democrats in LegCo. The democrats still draw major support from across
the HKSAR in the directly elected LegCo seats. Unlike the principal
officials, they do enjoy a popular mandate, which significantly enhances
legitimacy vis-A-vis the government. The HKSAR Government is rightly
focused on trying to improve its generally poor public ratings. Its failure
to engage more constructively with Hong Kong's "loyal opposition" in
LegCo has cost it public support. There is nothing in the POAS initiative
to indicate that government has any sort of plan drafted to try and address
this aspect of the LegCo-government relationship-malfunction.
The "opposition" in LegCo also faces concerns about the POAS that extend
beyond the new system's lack of democratic legitimacy. The recently
installed principal officials are, as noted, professional politicians. Even
though they do not need to secure popular re-election, the principal officials
know that they will need to work constantly to maintain an adequate level of
public favor and prevent themselves from being humiliated in the court of
public opinion. This means the citizens of the HKSAR can expect to see
principal officials "pressing the flesh" regularly in direct competition with the
generally less well-funded, popular politicians in LegCo. 45
The POAS is, in essence, a notably compromised reform. The
government (and Beijing) correctly concluded that Hong Kong's
previous colonial governance system was well past its expiration despite
the attempts made in the Basic Law to add significant "preservative" to
the model. Although neither were ready to link any sort of fresh
democratization initiative with the POAS reform there is now true
political reform-minus real political accountability.
The HKSAR Government (and, by implication, Beijing) have conceded
that accountability is now very much part of Hong Kong's political
vocabulary. The POAS has officially opened the door on the discussion of
government accountability in Hong Kong. If some accountability is,
authoritatively, a "good thing", it becomes more difficult to argue that
greater accountability does not make even better sense.
The very real constraints applying to political development in Hong
Kong mean that rapidly increased democratization is not likely and nor
does the POAS directly change the democratization equation. It has
made it impossible to argue that Hong Kong has some sort of
"everlasting" governance system, which is cemented into place by the
Basic Law, however. In fact, the Basic Law itself has sign-posted 2007
as the year during which (or not too long there-after) we should expect
to see some significant move towards increased democratization in Hong
Kong. One rather interesting outcome of the POAS initiative is that, at
the same time that it has ushered in a raft of planned, direct changes, it
has also, less directly but unavoidably, buttressed the position of those
arguing for an increased level of democracy in Hong Kong.
145. During March 2003, the POAS has been tested as never before. The Financial
Secretary (FS) of the HKSAR, ranked second in protocol among the ministers, was
found to have taken a tax advantage shortly prior to the handing down of the HKSAR,
2003 budget. The initial reaction of the FS was defensive-verging on arrogant.
Massive public-media discussion ensued. Shortly after this, the FS offered to resign.
The Chief Executive said that what the FS had done involved "gross negligence", was
"highly inappropriate", and constituted'a "breach" of the ministerial code. The Chief
Executive still declined to accept the resignation, however.
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APPENDIX I:
CHIEF EXECUTIVE ON THE PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS
ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEM
The following is the government -translation of the address by Chief
Executive, Tung Chee-hwa, at the Legislative Council on the
introduction of the POAS delivered on April 17, 2002.
In the 2000 Policy Address, I proposed that we should examine the
possibility of introducing a new Principal Officials Accountability
System. In my 2001 Policy Address, I set out in greater detail the
framework of the Accountability System being considered. In the last
two years, we have listened closely to the views of the community
through various channels. This includes attending a series of meetings
with the Legislative Council and listening to the views of Honorable
Members. We are heartened that the community have generally
identified with the concept of introducing the Accountability System. I
have decided to come in person to the Legislative Council to introduce
to Honorable Members the plans of the HKSAR Government for
introducing the Accountability System on July 1, 2002, and to seek
Members' support for the associated expenditure and the resolution for
the relevant legislation to be amended, so as to transfer relevant statutory
powers and functions to the respective Directors of Bureaus under the
Accountability System. Our hope is that the Accountability System can
be implemented on schedule.
In the last two Policy Addresses, I have emphasized that the purpose of
introducing the Accountability System is to enable Principal Officials of the
HKSAR Government to assume responsibility for their policy portfolios, to
share a common agenda and to have clear directions. We need to feel the
pulse of the community, to understand community sentiments, and to
strengthen liaison and communication with the Legislative Council,
different sectors of the community and the general public. We need to
improve the prioritizing of the Government's agenda and to improve overall
policy coordination, so that we would be in a position to provide better
services to the community and the general public.
Now let me set out the principal elements of the Accountability System.
Firstly, the upper echelon of the Government, including the Chief
Secretary for Administration, Financial Secretary, Secretary for Justice, and
all Directors of Bureaus, will be covered by the Accountability System.
These officials will no longer be civil servants, but will be appointed on
contract terms as Principal Officials under the Accountability System. They
may serve for a term of five years, but not exceeding that of the Chief
Executive who nominates them. They will cover the respective portfolios
assigned to them by the Chief Executive, oversee the work of associated
departments, formulate policies, explain policy decisions, market policy
proposals and gain the support of the Legislative Council and the public.
They will be accountable to the Chief Executive for the success or failure of
their policy initiatives. Under the leadership of the Chief Executive, they
will be accountable to the community. Where necessary, the Chief
Executive may terminate their contracts.
Secondly, all Principal Officials under the Accountability System will
be appointed to the Executive Council. This will strengthen the work of
the Executive Council. The Principal Officials will participate directly in
the Government's policy decision-making, in prioritizing the policy
agenda, and in harmonizing the work, which straddles across different
departments. In overall terms, governance will be improved; decision-
making will be quickened; responses to the demands of the community
and the needs of the public will be more direct. In accordance with the
provisions of the Basic Law, the Executive Council may continue to
include other community leaders and Members of the Legislative Council.
Thirdly, the remuneration of Principal Officials under the
Accountability System is comparable to the packages currently applicable.
Fourthly, various Policy Bureaus will be combined to facilitate better
deployment of resources and closer coordination of policy portfolios.
Through this re-organization, the original sixteen Policy Bureaus will be
revised to eleven. Including the three Secretaries of Departments,
following the restructuring, there will be fourteen Principal Officials
covered by the Accountability System. There are the Chief Secretary for
Administration, Financial Secretary, Secretary for Justice, Secretary for
Home Affairs, Secretary for Constitutional Affairs, Secretary for
Housing, Planning and Lands, Secretary for Education, Secretary for the
Environment, Health and Welfare, Secretary for Transport and Works,
Secretary for Economic Development, Secretary for Commerce,
Industry and Manpower, Secretary for Financial Affairs & the Treasury,
Secretary for Security, and Secretary for the Civil Service.
Fifthly, the terms and conditions of service of civil servants who
presently fill the positions of Directors of Bureaus will remain
unchanged. These positions will be re-titled Permanent Secretaries.
Under the Accountability System, they will act as the interface between
Directors of Bureaus and the civil service. Under the Direction of
Bureaus, the Permanent Secretaries will be responsible for formulating
and implementing policies, listening to the views of the public and the
Legislative Council, explaining policies to these respective groups,
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responding to questions raised and gaining support from different
quarters for Government policies.
In the process of formulating our proposals for the Accountability
System, we realize that various concerns have been raised among certain
quarters of the community-namely, that under the Accountability
System power might be concentrated in the Chief Executive; that as
there are Principal Officials and Permanent Secretaries under the
Accountability System, this will result in unnecessary duplication; that
the Accountability System will affect the stability, permanence,
professionalism, political neutrality and the uncorrupt nature of the civil
service. Let me take the opportunity to address these concerns.
Firstly, in implementing the Accountability System, will power be
concentrated in the hands of the Chief Executive? We all know that the
Basic Law has clear provisions governing the powers of the Chief
Executive. The Basic Law provides that the Chief Executive is the head
of the HKSAR Government. He leads the Government and the civil
service. According to the Basic Law, the powers of the officials of the
HKSAR Government originate from the Chief Executive. It is for the
Chief Executive to determine how he should delegate his authority
according to his policy agenda. As the Basic Law already conferred all
necessary powers on the Chief Executive, there is no need for these
powers to be strengthened by the new system; nor should such a
question arise. In fact, in implementing the Accountability System, the
Chief Executive will be devolving further his authority, not only to the
three Secretaries of Departments, but also to the eleven Directors of
Bureaus, so that in assuming responsibility for their respective
portfolios, they will have the necessary authority to formulate,
coordinate and implement policies.
In implementing the system, changes have to be made for each official
under the Accountability System to be responsible for his policy portfolio.
According to the design of the Accountability System, Directors of Bureaus
are ultimately responsible to the Chief Executive. However, the Chief
Executive will continue to rely on the Chief Secretary and Financial
Secretary to oversee and coordinate the work of the respective policy
bureaus and to coordinate work which straddles different policy bureaus.
The two Secretaries of Departments will also coordinate the work in respect
of important policy agendas and priorities determined by the Chief
Executive and Executive Council. For example, in the last year or so, the
Chief Secretary has covered Guangdong/Hong Kong cooperation and major
infrastructure coordination. The Financial Secretary has covered
discussions with the Mainland concerning the "Closer Economic
Partnership Arrangement". This modus operandi will not be changed
following the introduction of the Accountability System. Furthermore, the
role of the Executive Council will be enhanced. The Chief Secretary for
Administration will chair various Executive Council Sub-committees.
These Executive Council Sub-committees will replace the policy groups
under the Chief Secretary's Committee. Likewise, the Financial Secretary
will chair relevant Executive Council Sub-committees.
As for the inter-relationship between the respective Policy Bureaus, this
concerns primarily better use of resources and closer coordination between
related policy portfolios. Some of the policy bureaus will be combined. For
example, Housing, Planning and Lands will be amalgamated; Transport and
Works will be placed under one roof. In putting forth this re-organization,
we have reflected carefully on what would constitute the optimum
organization. We cannot have, and do not have, a pre-set number of policy
bureaus. We have to base our assessment on practical need and our
cumulative experience in running the Government. The proposals we have
put forth represent the most appropriate package.
To complement the introduction of the Accountability System, and to
facilitate strengthening of the coordination role of the Executive Council in
the decision-making process, the Executive Council Secretariat will be
transferred to the Chief Executive's Office. The position of Information
Coordinator will be re-titled as Director of the Chief Executive's Office.
The Director will oversee the running of the Executive Council Secretariat
and continue to perform the duties of the Information Coordinator.
In future, the Central Policy Unit will strengthen its capabilities in
respect of conducting surveys on public opinion and long-term policy
researches. This will ensure that in determining long-term policies, the
HKSAR Government will have a broad base of support in the community.
All of these adjustments are directed to one single purpose, i.e. to
enable Principal Officials under the Accountability System to have a
clear understanding of their respective responsibility, to strengthen
solidarity, to enhance internal working relationship, and to smooth
cooperation. The team will be able to set, coordinate and implement
policies more effectively to meet the needs of the community and our
expectations. They will also be able to meet proactively the challenges
facing Hong Kong. I would also like to emphasize that the checks and
balances designed for the HKSAR, including those in respect of the
Chief Executive and the Executive Authorities, will not be diminished
following the introduction of the Accountability System. The
Legislative Council will continue to play the same important role in
holding the Government accountable.
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In introducing the Accountability System, one of the fundamental aims is
to enable Principal Officials to be responsive to the calls of the community
in assuming personal responsibility for the success or failure of their
policies. This is to be done on the basis of maintaining the stability and
continuity of the Civil Service. There are increasing calls for senior civil
servants to be held accountable for policy failures, including calls for some
of them to step down. However, due to the permanence of the current
system and the established appointment and removal systems, the current
civil service system is not compatible with these demands. Furthermore,
following the return of Hong Kong to the motherland, and with the elected
Chief Executive, a fully elected legislature, the increasingly progressive and
aggressive media, Government operation and policy formulation are subject
to increasing public scrutiny and pressure. In addition to expectation for
Principal Officials to undertake their statutory duties, they have to cover
political work within the community. However, the traditional roles which
civil servants are expected to play under the current system run into conflict
with the demands of the times.
If we adopt an approach of introducing the Accountability System
within the civil service structure, we may achieve the ends of
"accountability". But in the process, we may lose the permanent,
professional and politically neutral civil service which has been
established through years of experience and efforts. Thus, in these
circumstances, it is appropriate for us to establish on top of the current
civil service system a new Principal Officials Accountability System
complemented by a suitable set of terms of employment.
Officials under the new Accountability System will not be civil
servants. They will no longer be constrained by the civil service
structure, and will be motivated by common perspectives, shared policy
goals and a collective mission. The Accountability System will provide
them with the environment to strengthen the communication and liaison
with the public in implementing policies. They will have more latitude
in strengthening their relationship with the Legislative Council and the
media, so that they will be able to gain broader public support and
assistance for their initiatives.
As I mentioned just now, in introducing the Accountability System, we
must ensure the continuity and the stability of the civil service structure.
Not only do we have to achieve this, but through the introduction of the
Accountability System, we must preserve and enhance the distinctive
qualities of the civil service system i.e. permanence, professionalism,
political neutrality, and an uncorrupt administration. These are the
qualities which I, and the Principal Officials under the Accountability
System in future, would wish to preserve. I also believe that the
community takes the same view. We wish to preserve these qualities,
because they are essential to the good governance of the HKSAR. With
the Accountability System, it will be possible for civil servants to focus on
their important role of implementing policies and putting forth proposals,
in the face of increasing political pressures and the need to be involved in
more political work. Furthermore, we have emphasized the importance of
retaining the D8 rank of Permanent Secretary as part of the civil service
system. We have taken this view in order to preserve the integrity of the
civil service system, to guarantee that we will continue to attract the best
and the brightest to the civil service career, and to ensure that our
community will benefit from having such talent to provide public service
of the highest quality. In order to highlight the importance which we
place on the civil service, we have determined that the Secretary for the
Civil Service should be selected from among senior civil servants. This
will guarantee that this Principal Official will have a full understanding
and appreciation of the civil service structure and system. As the
Secretary for the Civil Service will be a member of the Executive Council,
he will be able to represent the expectations and interests of the Civil
Service in the process of policy-making at the highest level of the
Government. At the same time, he can also convey the considerations
taken into account in respect of major decisions to civil service colleagues.
This will facilitate full and effective implementation of policies adopted.
There has been quite a lot of attention on the financial implications of
introducing the Accountability System. The HKSAR Government
intends to make the introduction of the Accountability System cost-
neutral within one year through internal redeployment of savings.
Furthermore, the remuneration of the Second Term Chief Executive will
remain basically at the present level, and will be adjusted necessarily
according to the current mechanism. It will not be increased due to the
introduction of the Accountability System. I suggest that the
remuneration package for the Third Term Chief Executive should be
considered by an independent committee.
I believe that by introducing the Accountability System in responding to
public demands, the HKSAR Government will bring about a new style of
governance. There will be two prominent changes. First, because officials
under the Accountability System will have to assume responsibility, they
will place importance on public opinion; they will make further efforts to
gauge public sentiments; they will be proactive in facing the public, and in
gaining the trust and support from the public through delivering results. By
so doing, the HKSAR Government will become more open, will be more
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prepared to listen to the voices of the people, will be more ready and able to
respond to public demands in a timely fashion, and will build a government
which has stronger public support.
Secondly, through the establishment of the top echelon of the HKSAR
Government under the Accountability System, our objectives will be
more clearly defined and our directions more firmly set. In pushing
forward our policy initiatives, we will be deploying our resources more
effectively; we will be more sensitive in setting priorities; the working
relationship between the Executive and the Legislature will be
strengthened. Accordingly, we will all be able to serve the public more
efficiently and more responsibly.
APPENDIX II:
NEW STRUCTURE OF THE POLICY BUREAUS UNDER THE POAS
FORMER PROPOSAL FINAL PRINCIPAL
STRUCTURE STRUCTURE STRUCTURE OFFICIAL
Civil Service Civil Service Civil Service Secretary for the
Bureau Bureau Bureau Civil Service
(Joseph Wong)
Trade, Industry, Commerce, Commerce, Secretary for
and Commerce Industry, and Industry, and Commerce,







Constitutional Constitutional Constitutional Secretary for
Affairs Bureau Affairs Bureau Affairs Bureau Constitutional
Affairs (Stephen
Lam)
Education and Economic Economic Secretary for
Manpower Development Development and Economic
Bureau Bureau Labor Bureau Development and
Labor (Stephen
Ip)
Education Education and Secretary for




Environment and Transport and Environmental, Secretary for
Food Bureau Works Bureau Transport, and Environment,
Works Bureau Transport, and
Works (Sarah
Liao)*
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Works Bureau Environment, Health and Secretary for
Health, and Welfare Bureau Health and




Financial Financial Financial Service Secretary for
Services Bureau Services Bureau Bureau and The Financial




Home Affairs Home Affairs Home Affairs Secretary for
Bureau Bureau Bureau Home Affairs
(Patrick Ho)*
Housing Bureau Housing, Housing, Secretary for
Planning, and Planning, and Housing,





Security Bureau Security Bureau Security Bureau Secretary for
Security (Regina
IP)
* Denotes recruitment from the private sector.
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